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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES:
RESTORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
THE PATENTEE AND THE ACCUSED
INFRINGERt
LISA A. DOLAK*
Congress enacted the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act ("Act")
to provide a remedy to accused patent infringers, whose enterprises
were potentially crippled by the threat of possible infringement liabil-
ity, but who lacked a cause of action to initiate judicial resolution of
the patentee's claim or the patent's validity.' For half a century the
federal courts, mindful of the Act's purpose, liberally construed its
jurisdictional requirement of an "actual controversy" between the pat-
entee and the accused infringer. 2 In its efforts to stabilize United States
patent law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has unduly
impeded accused infringers' access to the declaratory judgment rem-
edy. It has interpreted the Act to effectively require the accused in-
fringer to prove that the patentee's infringement action is imminent. 3
Neither the Act nor its legislative history contemplate such a require-
ment, which undermines the Act's intended utility.
The Federal Circuit's restrictive interpretation of the Act is par-
ticularly disturbing when considered in light of the patent statute's
provisions concerning the recovery of damages for infringing acts. 4
Under the statute, a party who is charged with infringement begins to
t © Lisa A. Dolak (1997).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; Or Counsel, Nixon, Har-
grave, Devans & Doyle LLP. 1 would like to thank Richard D. Rochford, jr. and Professors Christian
C. Day and Theodore Hagelin for their helpful comments, and Niall MacLeod and Steven Becker
for their research assistance.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994). The Act states, in relevant part, that:
kin a case of actual controversy ... any court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
2 See infra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 135-77 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
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accrue liability for damages.5
 While pre-Federal Circuit cases made
clear that a patentee's assertion of infringement enabled the accused
infringer to invoke the declaratory judgment jurisdiction of the federal
courts, recent Federal Circuit decisions have held such assertions of
infringement to be jurisdictionally insufficient. 6
 Thus, an accused in-
fringer can again, as before the passage of the Act, find itself at the
mercy of a patentee, accruing potential liability for damages while the
patentee controls whether, when and where to sue for infringement.
This asymmetry between the standards for notice of infringement and
declaratory judgment jurisdiction thwarts the purpose of the Act. 7
This article advocates a return to a more liberal interpretation of
the "actual controversy" predicate for declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion. At a minimum, a charge of infringement sufficient to trigger the
accrual of damages should be held, as a matter of law, to confer
declaratory judgment jurisdiction on a court. This test would better
serve Congressional intent underlying the Act and promote consistent
judicial decision-making.
The federal policy in favor of encouraging innovation through
government grant and enforcement of patents is as old as the coun-
try itself. 8
 Congress has furthered this policy by authorizing the fed-
eral courts9
 to punish infringement by enjoining infringing actsw and
awarding compensatory and exemplary damages" including, in "ex-
ceptional cases," attorney fees. 12 The economic power patentees pos-
sess is an integral part of the United States patent system, which has
received significant credit for the technological advances and standard
of living enjoyed by most Americans. 13
5 Id,
9 See infra notes 110-77 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power .
	 To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
9
 The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws. See
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
1 ° See 35 U.S.G. § 283 (1994).
" See id. § 284 (1994).
12 /d. § 285 (1994).
15 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 250 (1994); Thomas G. Field, Jr., Intellectual Property: Some Practical and Legal Fundamentals,
35 IDEA 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Fritz Machlup, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM,
STUDY No. 15 OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2d Sess. (1958)); Proclamation No. 6013, 54 Fed. Reg.
34,125 (1989) ("During the past 200 years, our Nation's patent and copyright laws have, as
Abraham Lincoln once observed, 'added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius' . . . Our
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Prior to 1934, the patentee's economic power was unchecked in
one highly significant respect: there was nothing to prevent a patentee
from effectively paralyzing an alleged infringer's enterprise with the
threat of enforcement at some indefinite time in the future." Patents
are complex legal documents,'' and even with the help of competent
patent counsel, it is often not possible for an accused infringer to
determine whether it will ultimately be found liable.IG Consequently,
when faced with a patentee's assertion of infringement, an accused
infringer was forced to choose between continuing the allegedly in-
fringing enterprise, uncertain as to whether it was accruing increasing
liability, for damages, and abandoning its business enterprise. 17 Even if
the accused infringer had a legal basis to attack the applicability or
validity of the patent, there was no way for the accused infringer to
remove the cloud which hung over its enterprise.' 8
In 1934, Congress sought to balance the tremendous economic
leverage enjoyed by patentees by providing accused infringers with the
opportunity to seek judicial resolution of claims of non-infringement
and/or invalidity.'`-' By demonstrating the existence of an "actual con-
troversy"—the jurisdictional prerequisite for the ActN—an accused in-
fringer is afforded an opportunity to "clear the air" by removing the
uncertainty and insecurity which results from a patentee's coercive but
extra-judicial efforts to enforce its patent. 21
standard of living, which is in part the result of American technology and innovation, has long
been the highest in the world.").
14 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
115 See Thomas J. Stueber, Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement, 17 Wm. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1055, 1057 (1991).
16 See generally Rick 1). Nydegger, Traversing the Section 112, Paragraph Six Field of Land
Mines: Does In re Donaldson Adequately Defuse the Problems? (Part 11), 77 j. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF, Soc'v 30, 56 (1995) ("As any judge knows who has been called upon to render a decision
on a question of claim infringement, one of the most difficult exercises in legal patent analysis
is the question of claim interpretation.").
17 See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. licolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
As has been observed, the accused infringer has a third alternative. He can continue to make
and sell the product. but pay an amount in settlement to the patentee to induce the patentee to
refrain front interfering with his enterprise. See Stephen H. Case & Mitchell A. Harwood, Current
Issue.s. in Prepackaged Chapter I I Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal Declaratory Indgulent
Act for Instant Reorganizations, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STunv, (Apr. 27, [992), available in
WESTLAW at 0685 ALI-ABA 1, 98 (noting that "[t] he patentee, on the other hand, is in the
position of being able to maintain the threat and choosing when, if ever, to bring the action").
18 See info note 100 and accompanying text.
1`3
	
a party accused of patent infringement with an opportunity to obtain judicial
resolution of its dispute with a patentee was one of the primary purposes for the enactment of
the Act. See infra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
2°28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
21 See id.
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For half a century the federal courts, including the regional courts
of appeals, interpreted the Act's "actual controversy" jurisdictional
standard liberally." An alleged infringer was able to demonstrate the
requisite controversy by showing, for example, that its customers had
been threatened with enforcement by the patentee," that the patentee
had notified it of the alleged infringement, 24 or even that the patentee
had publicly declared a construction of its patent that would encom-
pass the alleged infringer's activities.• The courts' willingness to enter-
tain declaratory judgment actions brought by alleged infringers in such
circumstances was based on their recognition of the "business realities"
the alleged infringers faced. 26
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit27 and vested the new court with jurisdiction over appeals in all
cases arising under the patent laws. 28 The Federal Circuit has brought
stability and uniformity to many patent law doctrines and improved
confidence in the value of patents. 29 The court's recent decisions on
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, however, raise concerns regarding
the availability of the declaratory judgment remedy. These decisions
suggest that the Federal Circuit is increasing its scrutiny of communi-
cations and conduct asserted to give rise to declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 30 The court has articulated a different standard from
its earlier decisions, 31 making jurisdiction more difficult to establish.
These changes conflict with the liberal construction of the standard
2-'4 See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Sticker Indus, Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a patentee's notice to plaintiff's customers indicating that their unlicensed use of
the plaintiff's product would make them infringers gave rise to an actual controversy under the
Act).
24 See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Intl, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) ("If ... a party
has actually been charged with infringement of the patent, there is, neressmily, a case or contro-
versy adequate to support jurisdiction of a complaint, or a counterclaim, under the Act" (em-
phasis added)); see also infra note 202.
25 See, e.g., Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. v. General Elec, Co., 291 F. Supp. 217, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y,
1968) (finding the presence of an actual controversy in a patentee's assertion that its patent
covered a composition whose component was being developed by the plaintiff', even where it was
undisputed that the patentee had never charged the plaintiff with infringement); see also
Treemond Cu. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 703, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1941) (allowing a manufac-
turer to maintain an action for declaratory judgment based on a patentee's trade journal notice
that its patent covered the process of making a chemical made by the manufficturer).
21 ' See infra note 1 13.
27 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(0(1), (4), 1338 (1994).
211 See infra note 204.
so See discussion infra Part
Sr See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
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for declaratory judgment jurisdiction that has existed since passage of
the Act,32 and are contrary to its underlying policies." At the very least,
the court's unexplained alteration of the standard for determining
whether an actual controversy exists has led to differing views in the
district courts regarding the significance of the change.'" These differ-
ing views illustrate the potential for confusion and inconsistency in the
interpretation of the patent laws, in contravention of the Federal Cir-
cuit's mission. 35
Moreover, interpreting the Act to place declaratory relief beyond
the reach of accused infringers is directly contrary to Congressional
intent." The problem is most clearly seen when considered in conjunc-
tion with the statutory requirement that a patentee, in some circum-
stances, give notice of an alleged infringement to begin the accrual of
damages against the alleged infringer." Under current Federal Circuit
law, a patentee's assertion that a specific act or product of another
infringes a particular patent, when made to the alleged infringer, will
trigger liability for damages, assuming the infringement is later proved
in court." Some recent Federal Circuit cases, however, have held that
such assertions of infringement, even when repeated, fall short of
creating the "actual controversy" required by the Act."
For example, suppose that LensCorp, a hypothetical manufac-
turer of eyeglass lenses, receives a letter from ChemCo, owner of a
patent on a chemical composition that ChemCo believes LensCorp is
using to produce lenses. In the letter, ChemCo asserts that LensCorp
is using "the composition falling within" a specific ChemCo patent.
LensCorp's attorney then meets with the attorney for ChemCo to
obtain additional information about ChemCo's infringement allega-
tion and to discuss possible license terms, should LensCorp determine
that taking a license from ChemCo is necessary. Several meetings take
place. During one meeting, ChemCo's attorney repeats the allegation
of infringement, and subsequently sends LensCorp another letter "re-
garding LensCorp's operations under ChemCo's U.S. Patent." During
32 See discussion infra Part
35 See discussion infra Part I.
34 See infra note 178.
35 See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4 (1981) ("The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit provides . . . a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law where
Congress determines that there is special need uniformity."); see also Atari, Inc. v. JS & A
Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,1437 (Fed. Cir, 1984).
36 See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
37 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994); see also discussion infra Part 1V.13.
38 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
" See discussion info Part 111.A.
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the course of the negotiations, LensCorp's attorney advises LensCorp
that its operations probably do infringe ChemCo's patent, but, in her
opinion, the patent is invalid because it does not satisfy the legal
requirements for patentability. LensCorp is confident in its attor-
ney's abilities but cognizant of the potentially severe consequences of
some future judgment of patent infringement. It thus decides to file
an action seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity and
non-infringement to resolve its right to continue manufacturing the
lenses.
Under recent decisions of the Federal Circuit, LensCorp's decla-
ratory judgment complaint will probably be dismissed on the ground
that there is no "actual controversy" between LensCorp and ChemCo.
Yet, there is no doubt that damages for patent infringement began
accruing against LensCorp at least as early as ChemCo's first letter to
LensCorp. LensCorp thus finds itself unable to obtain judicial resolu-
tion of its claims of non-infringement and invalidity, but potentially
accrues additional liability for patent infringement with every day it
continues to manufacture lenses. LensCorp and its shareholders can-
not bear the risks associated with the resulting uncertainty, and are
forced to choose between paying ChemCo royalties under a patent
LensCorp believes in good faith to be invalid, and ceasing manufacture
of its lenses.
Instead of viewing the alleged infringer's declaratory judgment
complaint which, as in the above hypothetical, states that the patentee
has asserted infringement, as giving rise to a concrete, immediate
controversy sufficient to satisfy the Act and the constitutional require-
ment for a "case or controversy," the Federal Circuit has focused on
whether the patentee's conduct evidences an intent to institute an
infringement action imminently.4° This latter evaluation is difficult for
courts to make. More importantly, it skews the balance Congress in-
tended to strike by passing the Act, once again placing accused infring-
ers at the mercy of patentees.
This article discusses the development and status of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction in patent cases. Furthermore, this article shows
that the Federal Circuit, by applying its recently developed jurisdic-
tional standard, has limited access to the declaratory judgment rem-
edy.'" Part I discusses the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the poli-
cies the Act is intended to serve, and the legal standards which have
4° See discussion infra Part III.
41 See infra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
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been developed through interpretation of the Act. 42 This Part further
describes the courts' statutory authority to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion even where a controversy is found." Part II discusses the sig-
nificant cases in the historical development of the governing legal
standards under the Act, providing examples of the liberal construc-
tion the jurisdictional aspect received prior to the institution of the
Federal Circuit." Part III examines the Federal Circuit's declaratory
judgment jurisprudence, highlights the tests the court has used to
determine whether jurisdiction exists, and discusses, in particular, sev-
eral recent decisions which limit the availability of the declaratory
judgment remedy for alleged infringers. 45 This Part further argues
that the Federal Circuit's heightened jurisdictional standard is unwar-
ranted, inconsistent with business realities, and incompatible with the
Act's policy. 46 Part IV discusses the relationship between the Act and
the statutory marking and notice requirements to show how an accused
infringer can, under current interpretations of the law of notice and
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, find itself in precisely the predica-
ment Congress intended to ameliorate in passing the Act. 47 Finally, Part
V advocates a more liberal construction of the Act than is presently
applied and suggests an approach for determining jurisdiction in par-
ticular factual circumstances. This approach will promote consistent
application of the notice and declaratory judgment jurisdiction stand-
ards, result in increased fairness for accused infringers and better serve
the policies underlying the relevant statutes. Specifically, courts should
examine the conduct and communications of patentees relied on for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to determine whether such conduct
would constitute notice of infringement for purposes of triggering
damage liability. If so, the conduct should be held sufficient to give
rise to jurisdiction under the Act as a matter of law. The recommended
approach will also serve as a helpful rule of decision for trial judges,
and, in accordance with the mission of the Federal Circuit, impart
greater uniformity and consistency to judicial decision-making.
42 See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 117-77 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 209-37 and accompanying text.
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I. THE FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
A. A Policy of Protection for Accused Patent Infringers
The Declaratory Judgment Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 48
In relevant part, it provides:
§ 2201. Creation of remedy
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, .. .
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appro-
priate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal rela-
dons of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 49
The statute was enacted in 1934. 5° The legislative history51
 shows that
Congress was primarily concerned with the plight of parties con-
fronted with uncertainties in their legal and business relations, but
who had no resort to the courts because the other party possessed
the cause of action. In particular, Congress heard about the di-
4" 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
49 1d.
" Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955.
The legislative history from the 1934 Congressional session is very limited because there
were no debates in either the House or the Senate on the bill that year. See 78 CoNG. REC.
10,564-65, 10,919 (1934) (Senate consideration); 78 CLING. Rae. 8224 (1934) (House considera-
tion). However, a bill proposing a federal declaratory judgment remedy had been introduced in
every Congressional session from 1919 to 1932, and the corresponding hearings demonstrate
that the primary purpose of the statute was to eliminate uncertainty. See, e.g., 1928 Hearings on
H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35
(1928) [hereinafter "1928 Senate Hearings"] (testimony of Professor Edson R. Sunderland, whose
1917 law review article (Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights
—The
Declaratory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REv. 69 (1917)) was instrumental in instituting the effort to
pass a federal declaratory judgment statute in the United States, contending that, without the
declaratory judgment remedy, parties must undergo great risks without knowledge of their
respective entitlements, and concluding that the declaratory judgment. "removes all that peril");
1928 Senate Hearings, supra at 16 (letter from Judge Cardozo, then Chief judge of the New York
State Court of Appeals, describing the remedy as "a useful expedient to litigants who would
otherwise have acted at their peril, or at best would have been exposed to harrowing delay.");
Hearing on HR 10143 Before the House Comm. on the judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1922)
[hereinafter "1922 House Hearings"] (statement of Rep. Summers) (the purpose of the declara-
tory judgment statute is "[t]o remove uncertainty. It seems to me the individual citizen has as
much right to be reasonably certain as to what the courts would determine his rights to be as he
has to be reasonably certain what the legislature has determined his rights to be.").
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lemma of the alleged patent infringer, described in testimony by
Professor Edson R. Sunderland, an advocate of the Act:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim
that you have a patent. What am I going to do about it? There
is no way that I can litigate my right, which I claim, to use
that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you [the
patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me
run up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me
run up, and then you may sue me for the damages, and I am
ruined, having acted all the time in good faith and on my
best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out
whether I had a right to use that device or not.52
The Federal Circuit has referred to this dilemma as "the sad and
saddening scenario that led to enactment of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act."" In the court's evocative description, "a patent owner
engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat with a
sheathed sword."54
In providing a route for an alleged infringer to challenge the
applicability and validity of a patent, the Act also serves the policies
underlying the patent laws. 55 Throughout history, courts have con-
strued the patent laws with regard to the strong public policy of pro-
moting free access to unpatented subject matter. 5" The Act affords an
opportunity for judicial scrutiny of patents that the patentee is using
to interfere with what is in actuality lawful conduct potentially ben-
eficial to society. 57
Professors Doernberg and Mushlin have prepared an excellent discussion of the jurisdic-
tional effect of the Declaratory judgment Act, which includes a thorough review of the legislative
history of the Act. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the
Declaratory Judgment Ad Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the
Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1989).
52 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 35.
53 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
54 /d. at 734-35. The court further refers to the patentee in such a situation as Ig]tierrillit-
like" and engaging in "scare-the-customer-and-run tactics." Id. at 735.
55 See id. at 734-35.
56 See, e.g, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1964) (holding that a
state's attempt to extend protection under state unfair competition laws to an unpatemable article
encroaches on the federal patent law policy of granting to the public that which is unpatentable).
57 Such patents have been referred to by judge Learned Hand as "scarecrow[s]." See Bresnick
v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943). The Supreme Court has also
emphasized the importance to the public of resolving questions of patent validity. Blonder-Tongue
Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338-47 (1971).
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B. The Jurisdictional Test
1. The "Actual Controversy" Requirement
The Act's sole prerequisite for jurisdiction is the presence of an
"actual controversy," a requirement of constitutional dimensions."
Anything short of an actual controversy would result in the court
rendering a forbidden advisory opinion. 59 The Supreme Court has
described the difficulty in constructing a specific test for divining the
existence of an actual controversy:
The difference between an abstract question and a "contro-
versy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is nec-
essarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be
possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every
case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the ques-
tion in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.6°
Nevertheless, a test for determining whether there is an actual
controversy in suits requesting a declaration of patent non-infringe-
ment or invalidity''' has been developed. The Federal Circuit has
essentially stated this test consistently throughout its history:
First, the [declaratory judgment] plaintiff must actually pro-
duce or be prepared to produce an allegedly infringing prod-
uct. Second, the patentee's conduct must have created an
objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of the plain-
tiff that the patentee will initiate suit if the activity in question
continues."2
58 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
59 See id. at 240-41.
°Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
61 Suits by accused infringers represent the traditional use of the declaratory judgment
remedy in patent cases, and are the subject of this article. In recent years, patent owners have
begun to use the declaratory judgment statute to obtain relief against potential infringers, For a
discussion of this nontraditional application of the statute, see Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual
Property Protection or Protectionism? Declaratory judgment Use By Patent Owners Against Prospective
Infringers, 42 A.M. U. L. Itr.v. 239 (1992).
ns EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 789
(1997). The first prong of the test is obviously intended, like the second, to ensure that the
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Thus, the first prong of the test focuses on the plaintiffs conduct;
the second looks to the conduct of the patentee.°
The reasonable apprehension must be objective, must exist at the
time suit is filed and must continue after the complaint is filed
because "Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live
case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case." 65
2. A Discretionary Remedy
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, in the case of an
actual controversy, the court "may declare the rights and .. . legal
relations" of a party.° This language has been interpreted to make the
exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction discretionary.° The Su-
preme Court has recently noted that the Act's "textual commitment to
discretion, and the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to
suggest, distinguish the declaratory judgment context from other areas
of the law in which concepts of discretion surface." 68 The trial court is
declaratory judgment plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the matter to establish a real conflict with
the defendant-patentee. This article is concerned with the communications and conduct required
to establish the "reasonable apprehension" referred to in the second prong and assumes without
further discussion that the first prong is satisfied for any given factual scenario described in the
balance of the article.
63 See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
61 See Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see rdso
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 651, 635 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Mater events may not
create jurisdiction where none existed at the time of filing."). This rule has been applied to deny
jurisdiction where, for example, the complaint in the declaratory judgment action was filed before
the subject patent issued. See GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 479, 481-82 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the traditional two-prong test for jurisdiction was met; however, in the
absence of a patent, the dispute was purely hypothetical and any decision would have been an
impermissible advisory opinion); see also Speelronics, 940 F.2d at 636 ("[T]he existence of issued
patent claims, presently enforceable ... , are a requisite to litigation of a declaratory judgment
action.").
Spertronics, 940 F.2d at 635 (quoting Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1549
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Burke v, Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987))). The court in Spectronics
held that the defendant-patentee's filing of a covenant not to sue the declaratory judgment
plaintiff on the patent at issue following the filing of the complaint rendered the controversy
moot. Id. at 637-38.
1 '6 28 U.S.C, § 2201 (1994) (emphasis added).
137 See Public Scrv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952).
rs Wii1011 V. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995). Wilton arose from an insurer's
federal declaratory judgment action for a determination that its policy did not cover its insured's
liability. Id. at 280. The insured filed a state court action on the policy one month after the
insurer's federal declaratory judgment action was instituted, and simultaneously moved to dismiss
or stay the federal action. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the district. court's decision to stay the declaratory judgment
action. Id. at 281, 282. The Court held that district courts enjoy a "unique breadth" of discretion
to decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act and need not identity "exceptional
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thus authorized to determine whether its time and resources will be
well-spent in deciding a particular dispute. 69
 The criteria which favor
the issuance of a declaratory judgment include "(1) when the judg-
ment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from
the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceed-
ing."7"A reviewing court may reverse a lower court's decision exercising
discretion under the Act when "(1) the court's decision was clearly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the decision was based on an
erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court's findings were clearly
erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the
court rationally could have based its decision."71
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Norton Co., the
Federal Circuit reviewed a district court's discretionary dismissal of a
declaratory judgment action. 72
 The defendant, Norton, was the owner
of U.S. Patent No. 4,623,364 (the "'364 patent"), which covered an
aluminum-based process for making "grains" used in sandpaper and
grinding wheels." The plaintiff, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co. ("3M"), had also filed a patent application covering an aluminum-
circumstances" to justify staying district court proceedings in favor of parallel state proceedings.
Id. at 287.
The Federal Circuit recently upheld a district court's decision to decline to hear an accused
infringer's declaratory judgment action, relying in part on the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilton. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807,814-15 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct
789 (1997). Noting that the Supreme Court in Wilton chose the deferential "abuse of discretion"
standard over the more probing "de novo" standard the Federal Circuit employed in Genentech,
Inc. tr. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931,936 (Fed, Cir. 1993), the court in EMC upheld the district
court's refusal to hear the accused infringer's declaratory judgment suit. EMC, 89 F.3d at 813-15.
The 8-0 decision of the Supreme Court in Wilton left no doubt about its view that district
courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to hear declaratory judgment cases. However,
Wilkes concerned an exercise of discretion in the lace of parallel state court proceedings involving
matters of state law, thereby "presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues."
515 U.S. at 290. In this regard, the Court expressly stated "Me do not attempt at this time to
delineate the outer boundaries of that discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising issues
of federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state proceedings." Id. Most declaratory
judgment claims in patent cases arc based on federal law, and there will rarely he related
coincident state court proceedings, as the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in patent
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Thus, it is not clear that the Supreme Court would uphold
a broad exercise of discretion to decline to hear an accused infringer's action for a declaration
of patent invalidity or non-infringement where a patentee has asserted infringement and the
accused infringer has access to no other forum.
" See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670,672 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70 E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 299 (2d ed. 1941), quoted in Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 929 F.2d at 672-73.
71
 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 929 F.2d at 673.
7 '2 Id. at 671.
73
 See, id.
September 1997] 	 DECIARATORY JUDGMENT JURISDICTION	 915
based process for making grains and had instituted an interference
proceeding74
 in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, seeking a deter-
mination as to which of the parties was the first to invent the process
and thus entitled to the patent. 75
 3M had used an aluminum-based
process prior to the issuance of the '364 patent but switched to an
iron-based process after the patent issued to avoid the potential accrual
of infringement damages. 76 During the parties' discussions concerning
their rights to the grain-making processes, Norton notified 3M that the
'364 patent covered both the aluminum- and iron-based processes. 77
Norton also sent letters to 3M's customers, demanding that they cease
use or sale of 3M's grain products. 78
 3M then filed a declaratory judg-
ment action, seeking a declaration that its iron-based process did not
infringe the '364 patent. 79 Norton moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that the pending interference could moot any declaration
issued by the court. 8" The district court agreed and dismissed the action
based solely on its discretion under the Act.'"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first observed that the case pre-
sented competing policy considerations. 82 On the one hand, the court
was concerned with conserving limited judicial resources." On the
other hand, the court was to consider the predicament of the party in
3M's position who seeks an "early adjudication of its rights and liabili-
ties" via the Act, which, the court noted, "was enacted precisely for
circumstances such as these."'" The court stated:
Norton has threatened 3M and its customers with the pros-
pect of infringement liability. As 3M continues to sell prod-
ucts it believes do not infringe, its potential liability grows.
These are among the problems the Declaratory judgment Act
74 See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1999). An imerference proceeding is an inter-parties proceeding
conducted in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office to decide which of - two or more parties claiming
to have made a particular invention was first in time. ,See ROBERT L. 1-leiRmoN, PATENTS AND THE
r•DERA t, CI RCH IT § 15.2 (3d ed. 1999). The prior inventor, aSsuming all other questions of
patentability have been resolved in his favor, is awarded the patent. See id,
7' See Minnesota Mining & Mk. Co., 929 F.2d at 671.
71 ' See id. at 671-72.
77 See id. at 672.
7n
	 id.
79 See id.
'3" See Minnesota Mining & Mk. Co., 929 E.2d at 672, Norton's argument was based on the
possibility that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office could declare the '364 patent invalid and
issue a patent for the alu ► inum-based process to 3M.
XI Id.
52 Id. at 673.
" See id.
" Id.
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sought to alleviate. . . . It surely would serve a "useful pur-
pose" for 3M and Norton to have a court decide whether use
of the iron-based process infringes a patent claiming an alu-
minum-based process. Moreover, resolution of that question
will "afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and con-
troversy" which the conflict between the parties has engen-
dered. Failure to do so may cause significant harm to 3M. 85
The Federal Circuit thus held that the district court abused its
discretion in declining to hear 3M's action, despite the fact that, as
the court acknowledged, an award of priority in the interference to
3M would moot the declaratory judgment action. 86
 The court de-
clined to theorize regarding an appropriate situation for a court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction, asserting only that "3M should have
had its rights and obligations determined in a court, . based on
the rights provided to it by the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . . To
allow [3M's] harms to go unremedied would undermine the in-
tended purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act."87
Circumstances justifying an appropriate discretionary declination
of jurisdiction will not be present in the great majority of declaratory
judgment actions brought by alleged infringers seeking judgments of
invalidity or non-infringement. As noted by the Federal Circuit, juris-
diction should be exercised when the declaratory judgment will "serve
a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue,"
and "terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and
controversy giving rise to the proceeding."88
 Given these criteria, and
the strong congressional policy of providing relief from uncertainty
and insecurity to those charged with infringing a patent, a court should
refuse to exercise jurisdiction only in the most exceptional circum-
stances. Yet, in EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., the Federal Circuit recently
upheld a district court's refusal to exercise declaratory judgment juris-
diction89
 where such a refusal was unwarranted. This result, together
with the Federal Circuit's recent unwillingness to afford the Act the
"' Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co, 929 F.2(1 at 673-74.
"" Id. at 674,
" Id. at 675.
w Id. at 672-73 (quoting Boitctimtn, ,supra note 70, at '299).
" 89 F.3(1 807, 815 (Fed, Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 789 (1997). The district court had
declined to consider whether an actual controversy existed between the parties, holding that, in
any event, it would decline to cxercisejtarisdiction. See id. at 809. The Federal Circuit held that
Norand's conduct was sufficient to create the constitutionally and statutorily required actual
controversy conferring jurisdiction on the district court. Id. at 811. The court then found no
abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 815.
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liberal construction intended by Congress and given by the courts in
pre-Federal Circuit patent cases, threatens the effectiveness of the
remedy and undermines the purposes for which the statute was en-
acted.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AGT IN
PRE-FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES
The first courts to interpret the Act, in actions brought by poten-
tial infringers to resolve their liability for patent infringement, were
mindful of the Act's origin and purpose."' For example, in one of its
early decisions applying the Act in a case for a declaration of patent
invalidity,"I the Third Circuit held that an actual controversy existed
between a patentee and a potential infringer, where the patentee had
neither threatened the plaintiff with suit nor charged the plaintiff with
infringement."2
 The plaintiff in Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. American
Anode, Inc. relied upon the following conduct of the patentee as evi-
dence of an actual controversy: (1) the patentee had sued a third party
for infringement based on the third party's practice of a process "simi-
lar" to the plaintiff's process;" (2) the suit against the third party was
brought following license negotiations between the third party and the
patentee, which culminated in the third party's refusal to take a license
from the patentee:" (3) license negotiations between the patentee and
plaintiff had broken down as a result of the parties' inability to agree
upon terms:95
 and (4) outside the courtroom during the trial of the
patentee's litigation with the third party, plaintiff's in-house patent
counsel heard the patentee's president state, in effect, that "it was a
disappointment to him that the manufacturers did not recognize the
EMC, the alleged infringer in EMC, was not a particularly sympathetic declaratory judgment
plaintiff. The facts suggested that EMC may have filed its action in order to interfere with attempts
by Norand, which was not a competitor of EMC, to sell its patent to a competitor of EMC. See id.
at 809. In addition, EMC's counsel admitted to Norand's counsel that the declaratory judgment.
complaint had been filed as "merely a defensive step" and that “EMC's management decided to
file suit because 'they just thought it was in their interest to protect themselves first and continue
discussions.'" Id. at 815. The Federal Circuit. also credited the district court's observation that a
party in EMC's position could use the declaratory judgment procedure as a tactic to improve its
bargaining position in negotiations with the patentee. Id. at 811. Nevertheless, the decision in
EMC is troubling because it demonstrates how a court can, through an exercise of its discretion,
close off access to declaratory relief even in the presence of an actual controversy.
9° See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
91 See Dewey Sc Almy Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1943).
92 Id. at 70-71.
93 Id. at 70.
at See id. at 69.
95 See id.
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great contribution which [the patentee] had made to the rubber
clipping art and now that the manufacturers were ganging up on them
they had to put a stop to it."96 It was undisputed that the patentee had
never threatened the plaintiff with suit nor charged the plaintiff with
infringement. 97 In fact, it was the patentee's uncontroverted assertion
that it "had no knowledge or reason to know that plaintiff was using
or had used any [relevant] process commercially.""
On this record, the district court in Dewey & Almy granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the patentee, dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint for a lack of jurisdiction under the Act." On appeal, the
Third Circuit began its analysis by recounting the perceived inequities
that led to the enactment of the Act:
Prior to the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the
patentee was in a position to make oppressive use of his
asserted monopoly while carefully avoiding the test of litiga-
tion with an alleged infringer . . . . Further, the patentee
might, in his own good time, sue the alleged infringer for an
accounting, after large damages on account of a possible
infringement had accrued . . . . The alleged infringer could
not take the initiative in litigation to challenge the validity or
scope of the patent.'"
To remedy this problem, Congress intended the Act "to avoid ac-
crual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to
afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his adversary
should see fit to begin suit, after damage had accrued."'w The Third
Circuit thus held that the Act should be liberally interpreted to give
effect to Congress' remedial purpose.' °2
On the facts before it in Dewey & Almy, the Third Circuit held
that the patentee's enforcement of its patent against another alleged
infringer who declined to take a license was sufficient evidence of a
"substantial controversy" between the patentee and the plaintiff "of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declara-
tory judgment."'" In so holding, the court dismissed the notion that a
911 Dervey C.e A lmy, 137 F.2d at 69.
" 7 See id.
98 id.
9" See id. at 68.
I'm' Id, at 69 (citing BORCHARI), supra note 70, at 803).
"ll Dewey &' Almy, 137 F.2d at 69 (quoting E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88
F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937)).
102 Id. :It 70.
1 "3 1d. (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co,, 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). The
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direct threat from the patentee to the plaintiff was necessary."' The
court found sufficient evidence of a controversy in the patentee's suit
against another alleged infringer "doing the same thing" as the plain-
tiff.'°• In dicta, however, the court indicated its willingness to construe
the Act even more freely:
If [the patentee] had published a printed notice or circular
asserting that use of the described . . . processes constitutes
an infringement of its patents this would undoubtedly mark
the existence of an actual controversy between the patentee
and all persons who engaged in practising [sic] the process,
whether they were known to the patentee or not."'
Other courts construing the new Act were also of the view that
jurisdiction would lie even where the patentee had never threat-
court supported its holding that the Declaratory judgment Act's jurisdictional requirements were
met by itemizing the plaintiffs choices given a contrary holding. The patentee, the court said,
had put the plaintiff "in the position where it must either (1) abandon the use of the process,
(2) accept. a license on terms which it deems disadvantageous, or (3) persist in piling up potential
damages against the day when it may fit [the plaintiff n] purposes to bring an infringement suit
against it."
Id. at 71.
"" Id. at. 70 ("Certainly the fact that [the defendant] had never made any direct threat to
sue [the plaintiff] is not conclusive of the problem.").
m5 /(i. at 71.
"'Dewey & Almy, 137 F.2d at 71; see also Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 703,
706 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that a patentee's publication of a notice in a trade journal of its
patent and the fact that the process of making, and "all uses of," a chemical known as "Estradiol"
were covered by its patent was sufficient to give rise to an actual controversy between it and
another manufacturer of the chemical). The court in Treemond rebuked the district court for
taking a less permissive view of the Declaratory judgment Act's jurisdictional requirement stating
that "f_slome District Courts seem to have found difficulty in freeing themselves from the strait-
jacket of the 'adversary' conception. They exhibit a tendency toward a narrow and technical
interpretation of an Act intended to be construed in accordance with its broad and wise purpose."
122 F.2(1 at 703. The Treemond court maintained that is more limited construction of the Act
"would . . , destroy its entire usefulness in patent litigation." Id. The court described the plight
of the pre-Act alleged infringer as follows:
Before the passage of that Act patentees received greater protection from the law
than was warranted by their patent monopoly. Competitors desiring to introduce
an article somewhat similar to one already patented met with much difficulty. The
patentee could, without bringing suit, publicly claim an infringement and threaten
to sue the manufacturer or anyone who dealt with the product in issue. Unless the
patentee's actions were of such a character that he 'night be shackled with the
sanctions of the law of unfair competition, he had his alleged infringer at his mercy.
Although the competitor's business was gravely injured, he was remediless and in
order to survive, he might he forced to make a settlement with a patentee whose
claim of infringement was absolutely unfounded.
Id. at 703-04.
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ened the plaintiff with litigation or accused the plaintiff of infringe-
ment.'"
Prior to the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the courts continued the tradition of liberally construing the
requirement for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.'° 8 They began to
consider whether a patentee's conduct in a given set of circumstances
had given rise to a "reasonable apprehension" of liability 109
 on the part
11 '7 See, e.g., Alfred Hofmann, Inc. v. Knitting Math. Corp., 123 E2d 458 (3d Cir. 1941); see
Leach v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co., 104 F.2d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1939) (stating in dicta that "[w] here a
patentee notifies the trade that a competitor is infringing, the competitor may bring an action
Wider the [Declaratory judgment] Act ... to have his rights and those of the patentee in respect
of the claimed infringement declared"); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105,
108-09 (6th Cir. 1939) (holding that an actual controversy existed where a patentee notified the
trade that the plaintiff's product was infringing and brought an infringement action against one
of the plaintiffs customers).
"See, e.g., Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1975)
("the requirement of a charge of infringement is liberally construed"); Sweetheart Plastics, Inc.
v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1971) ("[w]here the patent by its terms
raises a reasonable doubt as to whether or riot plaintiff's activities constitute an infringement ...
[do deny that a 'case or controversy' is present is to ignore the realities of business life") (quoting
6A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.20 (2d ed. 1966); Muller v. Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding a "threat of infringement"
from numerous patent interference proceedings involving the parties, a hold harmless agreement
that the plaintiff's licensee requested, and a letter from the patentee to the plaintiff's licensee
"cooling very close" to charging infringement); Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blow-Knox Co.,
367 F.2d 744, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1966) (asserting the necessity of liberally interpreting the Act in
order to give effect to its purpose, and holding that a patentee's notice to plaintiff's customers
indicating that their unlicensed use of the plaintiff's product would make them infringers gave
rise to an actual controversy under the Act); Blessings Corp. v. Altman, 373 F. Supp. 802, 806
(S.D.N,Y. 1974) ("any lingering possibility of an infringement charge is sufficient to support the
finding of an actual controversy so long as the plaintiff can demonstrate some actual harm to its
business"); Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 291 F. Stipp. 217, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(finding the presence of an actual controversy in a patentee's assertion that its patent covered a
composition whose component was being developed by the plaintiff, even where it was undisputed
that the patentee had never charged the plaintiff with infringement).
1 °9 The "reasonable apprehension" test has evolved over the 30 years in which it has been
used in patent cases. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Circuit Courts of Appeals
often looked for a "reasonable apprehension of liability" on the part of the alleged infringer. See,
e.g., Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir.
1981) ("kiln action for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, 'or that the plaintiff is not
infringing, is a case or controversy if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable apprehension that
he will be subject to liability if he continues to manufacture his product"). In contrast, the Federal
Circuit has required that the plaintiff demonstrate a "reasonable apprehension that it will fare
an infringement suit if it commences or continues the activity in question." Indium Corp. of Am.
v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing Jervis B. Webb
CO. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also Cygnus Therapeutic
Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[A]n actual controversy exists if there is
. , an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension
on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit ...."). The Federal
Circuit's formulation of the reasonable apprehension test requires the declaratory judgment
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of the alleged infringer, but made clear that a threat of suit on the part
of the patentee was not required. For example, the actual controversy
requirement was held to be satisfied in circumstances similar to those
found in Dewey & Almy, where the defendant patentee had publicly
espoused a construction for its patent that would embrace the plain-
tiffs product, had issued warnings, and had sued other parties for
infringement, even though the defendant disclaimed any knowledge
of the plaintiffs design before the declaratory judgment action was
commenced."' Similarly, a plaintiff's substantial investment in the de-
velopment of a product, whose principal use was in a chemical com-
position claimed by the patentee to be covered by its patent, gave rise
to the requisite controversy."' An exclusive licensee's letter to a decla-
ratory judgment plaintiff stating that "plaintiff's customers' right to
continue using plaintiffs [product] would remain 'to be settled" if its
licensor's patent application were granted, coupled with the licensee's
notices to customers that the patent had issued and that licenses were
available, was held to give rise to jurisdiction.'" Jurisdiction was also
found where a patentee, who had brought an infringement suit against
another competitor four years before learning of the plaintiff's prod-
uct, requested a sample of the product in order to "examine the same
and assure [itself] that there is no infringement" and the patentee's
director of new products orally informed the plaintiff's product engi-
neer that counsel had advised the patentee that the plaintiff's product
infringed. "3
plaintiff to establish a reasonable fear of imminent litigation, rather than a fear of ultimate
liability. See infra note 144.
") See japan Gas Lighter Assoc. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 238-42 (D.N,J. 1966).
III See Wallace & Tiernan, Inc., 291 F. Stipp. at 220-21.
is Sticker Indus. Supply Corp, v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1966). The
court also quoted Professor Moore's endorsement of a "very liberal interpretation of infringement
charges because the Declaratory judgment Act is designed to prevent the necessity of acting at
one's peril." Id. at 747 n.2 (quoting 6 Mown•, .supra note 108, 1 57.20).
113 Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, inc., 512 F.2d 724, 726 Sc n.3 (8th Cir. 1975).
The Sherwood court observed that "the requirement of a charge of infringement is liberally
construed" and stated that in determining whether or not an actual controversy exists, 'courts
should make a pragmatic judgment, aware of the business realities that are involved." Id. at 727,
728. The court continued:
To view the facts of this case any differently would be to totally ignore the realities
of business life. It would also contravene the well settled rule that the Declaratory
Judgment Act should be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of providing
a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes without invoking
coercive remedies and that it is not to be interpreted in any narrow or technical
sense.
Id. at 729.
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These cases illustrate the historical willingness to find jurisdiction,
consistent with the purposes of the Act and the "business realities"" 4
involved, whenever a patentee indicates its intent to enforce its patents,
even if only by conduct directed at third parties, and whenever a
potential infringer's activities place it at risk of liability. Clearly, the
courts did not require a threat of suit. Further, even a requirement for
a charge of infringement, to the extent imposed," was interpreted
liberally."" An examination of the declaratory judgment cases of the
The court in Research Institute for Medicine and Chemistry, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation, Inc., adopted a similar view of the reasonable apprehension standard:
1 take the test to be how most business people in the position of the declaratory
plaintiff would react to the information plaintiff might reasonably be expected to
have gathered at the time. The accent is on information, the nature, sources and
quantity of which are the sort upon which business people normally rely in making
decisions. Business people are not bound by rules of evidence. They do not leave
it to others to resolve issues of credibility. They learn from experience. They develop
intuition. A perceived threat of an infringement suit is real if would be a substan-
tial factor for most business people in their choice to proceed in one direction and
not in another.
The considerations which prompted passage of the Declaratory Judgments [sic]
Act and rendered it peculiarly appropriate in patent litigation continue today to
justify emphasis upon those apprehensions of declaratory plaintiffs shown to be
reasonable in a business world. This is the path to testing the definiteness, reality,
and controversy required by Article III, section 2.
647 F. Stipp. 761, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1986). The Research Institute court acknowledged the Federal
Circuit's requirement that the reasonable apprehension be objectively reasonable. See id.; see also
Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2t1879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (la] purely subjective
apprehension of an infringement suit is insufficient to satisfy the actual controversy require-
ment"). Based on its view of business realities, however, the court rejected the view that the
declaratory judgment plaintiff must convince the court that it risks suit: `lilt is not necessary that
the evidence received in court, having survived the rules of evidence, persuade the court itself
that the declaratory plaintiff probably will be stied by the declaratory defendant . . . ." Rearch
Inst., 647 F. Supp. at 768.
114 See Research Inst., 647 F. Supp. at 768.
115 The courts were particularly willing to overlook the absence of a threat of suit, or even a
charge of infringement, when the parties had previously been involved in litigation. For example,
in Broadview Chemical Corp. v. Loctite Corp., several of the declaratory judgment plaintiff's
products had been held to infringe the defendant-patentee's patents during litigation which
occurred over a five-year period. 417 17.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1969). The plaintiff then designed
and began to market a new line of products, and sought a declaration of non-infringement. See
id. The court sustained the complaint against the defendant's challenge after considering the
history of litigation and the defendant's letters to the plaintiff and its customers asserting that
the plaintiff was not capable of producing a non-infringing product. Id. at 999, 1001. Similarly,
a patentee's acknowledgment that "all past infringements were forgiven" in a settlement agree-
ment between the patentee and a direct infringer was held not to bar the alleged contributory
infringer's declaratory judgment action. See Blackman v. Hadron, Inc., 450 F.2d 781, 782-83 (2d
Cir. 1971).
"See generally Sherwood Med. Indus., 512 E.2d at 727 ("the requirement of a charge of
infringement is liberally construed"); Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504
(2d Cir. 1968) ("the requirement that there has been a 'charge of infringement' has been given
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Federal Circuit reveals a significant departure from this liberal con-
struction of the Act.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF THE "ACTUAL
CONTROVERSY" REQUIREMENT
A. The Evolution of the Federal Circuit's Declaratory Judgment
Jurisprudence
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had the oppor-
tunity to consider the availability of declaratory relief to potential
patent infringers in a variety of factual contexts. For the most part, the
Federal Circuit's decisions during its first decade. on the issue of
whether declaratory judgment jurisdiction existed in particular cir-
cumstances were not controversial. In general, the cases presented
relatively uncomplicated situations in which a straightforward applica-
tion of the Act's requirement for an actual controversy would lead to
a conclusion that the requisite controversy did or did not exist." 7
A comparatively more complex case was presented to the court in
Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc." 8 In early 1986, Ecolo-
chem, a competitor of Arrowhead, filed suit against a third party for
a very liberal interpretation"); Blessings Corp. v. Altman, 373 F. Stipp. 802, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("it appears that any lingering possibility of an infringement charge is sufficient to support the
finding of an actual controversy so long as the plaintiff can demonstrate some actual harm to its
business").
117 For example, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, the patentee had brought a state court action
to recover damages from its licensee, which had ceased payments under the parties' license. 716
F.2d 874, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In concluding that jurisdiction existed under the Declaratory
Judgment Act in the licensee's suit against the patentee, the court relied upon the pending state
court action and the patentee's allegations in its state court complaint that the licensee's subli-
censee was selling a product covered by the patent at issue, a claim which could render the
licensee liable for inducement of patent infringement and contributory infringement. Id. at
880-81. In Indium Corp. of America v. Semi -Alloys, Inc., the court refused to find the presence of
an actual controversy based on the patentee's offer of a non-exclusive license to the declaratory
judgment plaintiff. 781 E2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court held that prior patent litigation
initiated by the patentee seven years earlier against two parties unconnected with the plaintiff
was too remote to confer standing on the plaintiff, even considered with the license offer. Id.
Two years after its decision in Indium, the court determined that an actual controversy existed
between a patentee and a declaratory judgment plaintiff where a state court suit brought by the
patentee against the plaintiff for trade secret misappropriation was pending at the time that the
patentee's patents issued, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955-56,
956 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The patentee's representative also had told the plaintifEs in-house
counsel that the parties "would have to talk about infringement of the patents by [the plaintiff]
and possible licensing since [the plaintiff] might be liable for past patent infringement" and "t he
parties might end up in Federal Court on these issues." Id.
t18 846 E2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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infringement of the patent at issue:1 ' 9 A few months later, Ecolochem's
president sent a cautionary letter to an Arrowhead customer, Virginia
Power, which had contracted for Arrowhead's water treatment serv-
ices. 12" The letter read, in part:
Please be advised that Arrowhead Industrial Water is not
licensed to use our process and we would therefore consider
any use a direct patent infringement. Unfortunately, any such
infringement could possibly involve Virginia Power as well so
I believe it is valuable for you to have information on this
patent in order to protect yourself and eliminate any poten-
tial conflict.' 21
Reacting to Ecolochem's letter, Arrowhead's customer demanded
and obtained an indemnity from Arrowhead, which then received
a letter from Ecolochem's counsel stating that Ecolochem "has
reason to believe that Arrowhead is contemplating or has initiated
the practice of the patented process." 122 Ecolochem's letter fur-
ther sought, within twenty days, Arrowhead's confirmation that
any "unauthorized" practice, "if such practice exists" be "immedi-
ately" discontinued, and warned that Ecolochem "has in the past
not hesitated to protect its patent rights whenever appropriate."'"
Ecolochem's attorney subsequently confirmed that the latter state-
ment referred to "federal patent infringement litigation brought by
our client in respect of its patents. ,'I24
Shortly after Arrowhead began providing its services to its cus-
tomer, it filed a declaratory judgment action against Ecolochem, con-
tending that Ecolochem's patent was invalid, unenforceable and not
infringed. 125 The district court dismissed the action as not predicated
on an actual controversy. 126 Arrowhead refiled its declaratory judgment
action, re-alleging the above facts, and quoting from Ecolochem's suit
against the third party, in which Ecolochem proposed a finding of fact
that "Arrowhead [has] practiced . . . a process that infringes" Ecolo-
chem's patent.' 27
119 See id. at 733.
12° See id.
121 Id.
1221d.
12:1
	
846 F.2d at 733.
1.241d,
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 Id. at 734.
September 19971	 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT JURISDICTION 	 925
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
second action for lack of jurisdiction. 128 The court began its analysis by
eloquently describing the plight of the accused patent infringer prior
to the passage of the Act. 12  Applying the familiar "reasonable appre-
hension" test.'• to the circumstances at hand, the court concluded that
the facts presented "a clear actual controversy," and required a reversal
of the district court's determination)
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Arrowhead is replete with refer-
ences to the policies underlying the Actin and to the "realities of
business life"'” a potential infringer must confront." 4 Through these
references and other comments throughout the opinion, the court
conveys a relatively expansive, permissive attitude toward the availabil-
ity of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. This expansive attitude con-
trasts with the court's approach in more recent cases.
128 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 737-38. The issue of whether a patentee's conduct gives rise to an
actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act is a question of law, subject to de novo
review. See HARMON, supra note 74, § 8.1(a) (ii).
129 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 734-35; see also supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
L" See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
131 Id. at 736-39.
152 For example, the court noted that "Ecolochem's brief says it merely considered litigation
a 'reasonable alternative,' leaving unanswered the question, 'alternative to what?' The only
alternative appearing in the record would be [Arrowhead's customer's] transfer of its order from
Arrowhead to Ecolochem and Arrowhead's capitulation to Ecolochem's 'alternative' method of
enforcing its patent," Id. at 737 n.7. Elsewhere, rejecting the district court's conclusion that
Ecolochem's proposed finding of fact in its other litigation was of no significance because it was
not communicated directly to Arrowhead, the court stated that "a requirement for communicat-
ing a specific charge to Arrowhead would free Ecolochem to employ forever its thinly veiled threat
and its patent-enforcement-by-letter tactics attempted here, thereby defeating the very purpose
of the Act." Id. at 737.
I " Id.
13 Regarding the proposed finding of fact submitted by Ecolochem in its other litigation,
the court observed:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how a prudent Arrowhead executive
confronted with the totality of Ecolochem's conduct could resist the onset of a most
reasonable apprehension that Arrowhead is next. Indeed, considering the realities
of business lile, such an executive could incur the wrath of stockholders if he or
she either continued to offer Arrowhead's process without seeking a resolution of
the obvious conflict of interests or supinely and unjustifiably abandoned the proc-
ess.
Id. Thus, the court took the view in Arrowhead that the accused infringer, cognizant of "business
realities," in effect had no choice but to file an action for a declaratory judgment. See id. Later
in the opinion, the court again indicated its appreciation for Arrowhead's predicament:
That a competitor is siting a third party and asking the court to find one's company
a co-infringer can hardly contribute to euphoria. The law does not require enter-
prises to keep their heads in the sand while a patentee picks them off one by one
and at its leisure.
Id. at 738.
926	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 38:903
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco co./p.m
illustrates this contrast. Shell manufactured catalysts for making poly-
olefins.' 36 Before beginning production of one particular catalyst, Shell
initiated discussions with Mobil, which held a patent on compositions
related to those used by Shell to produce its catalyst.'" Over the course
of about nine months, attorneys for Shell and Amoco held three
face-to-face meetings, had numerous telephone conversations and ex-
changed correspondence concerning the proposed terms of a license
under Amoco's patent.' 38 During the course of these negotiations,
Amoco's attorney made several assertions concerning the relevance of
the Amoco patent to Shell's proposed product.' 39 In one letter, Amoco
referred to Shell's product as "the catalyst falling within the Amoco
patent."'" Amoco's attorney also allegedly stated that Shell's catalyst
would infringe even if it did not contain a particular component
recited in the patent claims as long as it was made from that compo-
nent."' Following the parties' final meeting prior to Shell's filing of its
declaratory judgment complaint, Amoco wrote to Shell, referring to
the meeting as "regarding Shell's operations under Amoco's U.S. Pat-
en t. "' 42
Notwithstanding these assertions by Amoco concerning its patent
and Shell's product, the Federal Circuit in Shell Oil upheld the district
court's dismissal of Shell's declaratory judgment action. 143 The court
stated that the plaintiff must demonstrate that it has a "reasonable
apprehension that it will be sued" to satisfy the requirement for an
actual controversy."' Although the court indicated that "express
135 970 F.2d 885 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
136 See id. at 886.
137 See id.
1 s8 See id. at 886-87.
139 See id. The court notes that Shell began commercial production of its catalyst in May 1990,
about two months into the negotiations, satisfying the first prong of the "actual controversy" test.
See id. at 887 n.2.
140 Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 886.
" 1 See id.
142 Id. at 887. Amoco's letter also stated that "although Shell disagrees that Amoco's patent
covers Shell's operations, it recognizes that the claims of such patent may be read to do so." Id.
It further offered Shell a limited license wherein "Shell would obtain a right to manufacture its
specific catalyst but not a general right to manufacture any other catalyst which may be covered
under the patent." Id.
143 /d, at 889.
"4 See id. at 888. In its articulations of the standard for establishing the existence of an actual
controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Federal Circuit has consistently referred to
a "reasonable apprehension of suit" or, as in Shell Oil, a "reasonable apprehension that the
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charges of infringement" can create the requisite apprehension,"' it
held none of Amoco's statements concerning the application of its
patent to Shell's product to be an express infringement charge. 14" The
court relied primarily on (1) Shell's initiation of the negotiations with
Amoco, 147 and (2) Amoco's statements being made in the context of
plaintiff] will be sued." See, e.g., Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d
1051, 1052 (Fed. Cir, 1995) ("there must be ... 'an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face
an infringement suit" '); Arrowhead, 846 F.2r1 at 736 ("the defendant's conduct must have created
on the part of plaintiff a reasonable apprehension that the defendant will initiate suit if the
plaintiff continues the allegedly infringing activity") (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874,
879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[c]ourts have interpreted the convoversy requitement in the patent field
to generally mean that . . . there is a reasonable threat that the patentee ... will bring an
infringement suit against the alleged infringer"). As is discussed further infra at Part 111,B., this
formulation of the test is neither consistent with the pre-Federal Circuit case law, nor compelled
by the Act.
145 Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888. In a previous case, the court had indicated that, without question,
an express charge of infringement is sufficient to vest a court with declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion:
If' defendant has expressly charged a current activity of the plaintiff as an infringe-
ment, there is clearly an actual controversy, certainty has rendered apprehension
irrelevant, and one need say no more. In light of the subtleties in lawyer language,
however, the courts have not required an express infringement charge. When the
defendant's conduct, including its statements, falls short of an express charge, one
must consider the 'totality of the circumstances' in determining whether that
conduct meets the first prong of the test. lithe circumstances warrant, a reasonable
apprehension may be found in the absence of any communication from defendant
to plaintiff.
Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (citations omitted).
146 Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888-89 ("We agree . . . that a statement that Shell's activities 'fall
within' Amoco's claims in the context of the parties' licensing negotiations can hardly be
considered an express charge of infringement"; "Amoco's use of language to indicate that Shell's
activities 'fall within,' arc 'covered by,' and are 'operations under' Amoco's patent fall short of
alleging infringement.").
147 Id. at 889 ("[Amoco's statements] were responses, characterizations, and arguments aris-
ing from discussions Shell initiated."). Although the court made repeated reference to Amoco's
initially responsive posture in the negotiations ("Amoco took no action against Shell; it made no
assertive contact concerning the patent .... We will not encourage litigation by finding a threat
to sue only because a non-threatening party, when approached by a possible infringer, asserted
its best arguments in discussions.") , it also characterized Shell's conduct as "an exercise of prudent
good business citizenship" and "praiseworthy." Id. The court noted that the alternative firr Shell
was to "wait to be caught in a possibly infringing posture." Id. Thus, the court recognized Shell
as a potential infringer seeking certainty in the face of assertions of infringement—precisely the
situation Congress sought to address with the Declaratory Judgment Act—but refused access to
the remedy Congress authorized, in part because Shell ascertained the existence of the contro-
versy through its own initiative. See id. When, however, an actual controversy between a patentee
and a potential infringer on the issue of infringement or validity or both. is evidenced, as in Shell
Oil, by well-developed, concrete, and opposing positions held by the parties on these 'MACS, which
party initiated the process by which the positions were developed should be irrelevant.
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license negotiations."' Apparently concerned, however, about the fu-
ture effect of its holding in Shell Oil, the court also stated:
[w]e do not hold that in every instance in which a potential
infringer approaches a patentee that an actual controversy
cannot arise. Whether an actual controversy exists depends
on either an express charge of infringement or, if none, the
totality of the circumstances. A reasonable apprehension of
an intent to initiate an infringement suit may be found from
statements made during licensing negotiations, since the pos-
sibility of litigation may objectively appear to compel accep-
tance of offered terms. This is not the case here; Amoco's
conduct did not rise to the level of a threat of an infringement
suit.' 49
Thus, despite the court's professed view that an express charge of
infringement satisfies the reasonable apprehension standard,' i° the
court indicated its implicit requirement for the presence of a threat
of suit—a higher threshold of conduct for the patentee before
declaratory judgment jurisdiction will be found. The court repeat-
edly referred to the absence of a "threat,"''' focused on whether
Amoco would sue,' 52 refused to regard Amoco's multiple asser-
tions of the applicability of its patent to Shell's activities as express
148 See id. (agreeing with Amoco that its statements were merely "'jawboning' which typically
occurs in licensing negotiations").
149 Id. During Shell's final pre-litigation meeting with Amoco, Shell indicated that the nego-
tiations were at an impasse and that litigation seemed likely. See id. Amoco's attorney gave his
view that Shell could not initiate a declaratory judgment action before it began manufacturing
its catalyst. See id. Shell's representative informed Amoco's attorney that Shell had begun com-
mercial manufacture and asked, "I assume you will enforce your patent?," to which an Amoco
representative responded, "Yes." Id. at 887. The court viewed Amoco's response as "reflexive and
obligatory," "necessary," and insufficient to create a reasonable apprehension in Shell. Id. at 889.
However, this exchange indicates Amoco's belief, as of the time of the exchange, that its state-
ments and conduct were sufficient to satisfy the "reasonable apprehension" prong of the decla-
ratory judgment test. See id.
'°° See id. at 887-88.
151 Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 889. The court noted, for example:
[Amoco] issued no threats .... [Ht should not be considered to have threatened
Shell with suit . . . . The language closest to constituting a threat occurred when
Shell asked if Amoco intended to enforce its patent . . . . (Amoco's) answer was
reflexive and obligatory . We will not encourage litigation by finding a threat
to sue only because a non-threatening party . . . asserted its best arguments in
discussions . . . Amoco's conduct did not rise to the level of a threat of an
infringement suit.
Id.
152 See id. ( is possible that, even after the conversations reached an impasse, Amoco might
never have sued, either because the validity of its patent was doubtful or its infringement
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charges of infringement' 53 and emphasized the license negotiations
context.'" The court paid lip service to the established disjunctive,
two-part inquiry into, first, the existence of any "express charges of
infringement," and second, "if none, then to the totality of the
circumstances."'" The court, however, effectively read the former
out of the test by concluding that, at least for this case, charges of
infringement made during license negotiations are insulated under
a "totality of the circumstances" analysis.'"
These two aspects of Shell Oil—the implicit requirement of a
threat of suit on the part of the patentee and the insulating effect of
license negotiations—were important factors in the Federal Circuit's
refusal to find declaratory judgment jurisdiction in subsequent cases.
A year after Shell Oil, the court incorporated its implicit requirement
for a threat of suit into its jurisdictional test.'" Without explanation,
the court replaced the "express charge of infringement" prong of its
familiar two-prong reasonable apprehension test" with a requirement
of "an explicit threat . . . which creates a reasonable apprehension on
the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an
infringement suit." 159 In BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., the
court applied this test to uphold a district court's determination that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear a licensor's declaratory judgment action
against a patentee. The licensor had contended that statements made
argument was too weak."). The court's focus on whether Amoco "might never have sued"
following the breakdown of negotiations with Shell is misplaced because the patentee's unex-
pressed, subjective view of the strength of its litigation position cannot logically be a factor in
determining the potential infringer's objective, reasonable apprehension. Furthermore, the court
seems to condone the knowing use of a patent of dubious validity and/or applicability to coerce
or, at best, influence a potential infringer's acquiescence or behavior. Yet, the Declaratory
Judgment Act was directed precisely at eliminating such use of "scarecrow" patents. See Cardinal
Chem. Co. v. Morton Intl, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993).
155 See Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888.
154 See id. at 889.
Lr'n Id. at 888.
156
 Id, at 888-89.
157 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
158 See, e.g., Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888 ("[w]e must look for any express charges of infringe-
ment, and if none, then to the "totality of the circumstances"); see also Arrowhead Indus. Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("If defendant has expressly charged
a current activity of the plaintiff as an infringement, there is clearly an actual controversy ....
When the defendant's conduct, including its statements, falls short of an express charge, one
must consider the 'totality of the circumstances' ... .").
Ing BP Chem., 4 F.3d at 978 (emphasis added). As an alternative to an explicit threat, the
court stated that "other action of the patentee" may create the requisite apprehension on the
part of the potential infringer. Id. This alternative parallels and is presumably consistent with the
"totality of the circumstances" prong of the court's earlier formulations of the reasonable appre-
hension test. See supra note 157.
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by the patentee concerning the strength of its patent and its intent to
enforce the patent placed the licensor's licensees in reasonable appre-
hension of suit and led them to deal with the patentee instead of the
licensor.'"
The Federal Circuit considered the presence of "ongoing license
negotiations" between a patentee and a potential infringer to be a
significant factor in negating the existence of an actual controversy
between the parties in its decision in Phillips Plastic-5 Carp. v. Kato
Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha.' 61 Kato, the patentee, had contacted Phil-
lips through its counsel in October 1987, stating that certain fasteners
made by Phillips were "covered by" Kato's patent.' 62 At the same time,
Kato offered Phillips a license under the patent.' 63 Following Phillips'
response that the patent was invalid in view of certain prior art, there
was no further communication between the parties until 1992.' 64 In the
meantime, Kato successfully reissued its patent.' 65 In a letter to Phillips
in 1992, Kato's attorney again offered Phillips a license, contingent
upon the parties' ability to reach agreement as to terms. Subsequent
communications between the parties'" did not result in an agreement,
and Phillips filed a declaratory judgment action in December 1992. 167
16* See BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978-80. BP Chemicals and Union Carbide were competitors in
the business of licensing technology for the manufacture of ethylene polymers. See id. at 976.
During an evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, witnesses testified that Union Carbide, in the course of marketing its patented
"condensing mode" technology to customers, including licensees of BP Chemicals, had empha-
sized the advantages of the technology, referred to the strength of its patent, and "made clear to
BP Chemicals and the potential licensees that Union Carbide would enforce the condensing
mode patent against infringers." Id. at 978-79. At least one of BP Chemicals' licensees sub-
sequently took a license from Union Carbide, which, according to BP Chemicals, demonstrated
the licensee's apprehension of suit. See id. The Federal Circuit, despite its view that the case
presented a "close factual question," held that neither BP Chemicals nor its licensees had a
reasonable apprehensions of suit. Id. at 980. BP Chemicals is noteworthy for the unexplained
revision of the reasonable apprehension test. See supra note 109.
161 57 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
162 See id. at 1052.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id. The patent laws authorize the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("P1'0") to reissue
a patent "for the invention disclosed in the original patent" to correct certain errors made during
the original prosecution if the patentee can show that the error was made without deceptive
intent. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). Only a patent's owner may apply for its reissue. See id. 1-lowever,
members of the public may "protest" the reissuance of the patent, by providing the PTO with
patents or other publications that the protestor contends invalidate the patent. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.11 (b), 1.291(h) (1995). Phillips participated as a protestor in the Kato reissue procedure.
See Phillips Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1052.
166 Phillips had by this time sold its fastener business to Illinois Tool Works, but it remained
liable for patent infringement pursuant to a contractual indemnification obligation. See Phillips
Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1052.
167 See id.
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The district court held that Kato's assertion that Phillips' products
were "covered by" its patent did not constitute a charge of infringe-
ment,'"" and that Phillips had not otherwise established a reasonable
apprehension of suit.' 6" The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district courtm without explicitly approving, or even commenting
on, the district court's determination that Kato did not charge Phillips
with infringement.ffl As in BP Chemicals,' 72 the court required "an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reason-
able apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will
face an infringement suit."'" The court made no reference to its
previous "express charge" standard and again offered no explanation
as to the reason for, or the significance of, the substitution of "explicit
threat" for "express charge" in its jurisdictional test. 174 While stating
that "access to declaratory procedures in patent cases does not neces-
sarily require an explicit threat of suit," and "the requirement that
the declaratory plaintiff be under a reasonable apprehension of suit
does not require that the patentee be known to be poised on the
courthouse steps,"'" the Federal Circuit clearly measured Kato's con-
duct against a threshold of threat.'"
165
 See a Later in its opinion, the Federal Circuit did note that no reasonable apprehension
of suit was found in Shell Oil, "despite the patentee's statements that the alleged infringer's
activities 'fall within,' are 'covered by,' and are 'operations Under' the patent." Id. at 1054.
159 See id. at 1052.
1 " Id. at 1053-54.
171 See Phillips Plastics, 57 F,3d at 1053-54. As further discussed infra in Part III.B., it is difficult
to comprehend how a patentee's assertion that particular operations of a potential infringer are
"covered by" a particular patent of the patentee is not an "express charge of infringement," given
the plain meaning of the words themselves and the historical judicial interpretation of the
Declaratory judgment Act. See supra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 155.
175 Phillips Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1052.
174 See id. at 1052-54.
175 Id. at 1053. The court was presumably referring to the "other action of the patentee"
alternative to the explicit threat requirement of its reasonable apprehension test. See supra note
158.
17''
	 Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1054,
177 Id. at 1052-54. The court never addressed the issue of whether jurisdiction could be fimnd
under the "express charge of infringement" standard. Instead, the court confined its opinion to
a consideration of whether Kato had threatened Phillips with suit. The court's approach is
well-summarized by the opinion's concluding sentence: "Kato's activity was not a threat or suit,
and did not create a justiciable controversy." Id. at 1054. Having established a de facto "threat of
suit" as the requirement for jurisdiction and characterizing Kato's conduct as nothing more than
an "offer of a patent license," the court, without difficulty, concluded that the jurisdictional
standard had not been met. See id. at 1053-54. Indeed, the opinion's implication is that the case
did not present a close question. See id.
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B. Criticism of the Federal Circuit's Recent Decisions on Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit's unexplained departure from its own settled
expression of the "express charge of infringement" standard, even if it
were without legal effect, would be worthy of criticism merely for its
potential unsettling effect on the lower courts.' 78 However, as the deci-
sion in Phillips Plastics' 79 most clearly illustrates,'s° the Federal Circuit
has in fact imposed a higher standard on declaratory judgment plain-
tiffs in recent years. The more rigorous requirement for a threat of suit
is a clear departure from pre-Federal Circuit case law's' and even from
the Federal Circuit's own early decisions.' 82 It is also inconsistent with
the goals of the Act.'"
The Federal Circuit's treatment of two of the accused infringer's
arguments in Phillips Plastics is illustrative. First, Phillips contended
that an actual controversy between the parties existed because nego-
tiations between them had broken down.'" The court rejected this
argument, noting that Phillips had not so notified Kato.'ss The court
distinguished the situation in Phillips Plastics from that in Oci-Office
Systems, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 186 where the district court found
jurisdiction because the accused infringer had terminated the parties'
discussions at their last meeting before filing its declaratory judgment
action. 187 Clearly, a requirement that one of the parties declare an end
178 At least two lower courts, in opinions written since the Federal Circuit's decision in Shell
Oil, have taken opposing positions on the issue of whether an "express charge" is a lower standard
than an "explicit threat." See Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1524, 1529
n.4 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Oce-Office Sys., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 805 F. Supp. 642, 645-46
(N.D. Ili. 1992).
179 57 F.3d 1051; see supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
186 The court's decision in Shell Oil is also based on a requirement, albeit an implicit one,
that the patentee threaten suit. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
581 See supra Part II.
182 See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
184 See Phillips Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1053.
185 Id.
186 805 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ili. 1992).
187 See Phillips Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1054; Oci,-Office Sys., 805 F. Supp. at 645, 647. Significantly,
the court in Oce-Office Systems expressly rejected Kodak's contention that no actual controversy
existed because it had never "directly or indirectly threatened to sue Oce for infringement." 805
F. Supp. at 645. The court observed that:
this reliance is misplaced because an express threat to sue is not necessary in order
for there to be a justiciable controversy in ... patent cases.... Requiring an express
charge [sic] of litigation would destroy the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment
Act, which in patent cases is to provide the allegedly infringing party relief from
uncertainty and delay with regard to its legal rights.
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to negotiations before a declaratory judgment suit can be brought
would, at best, encourage gamesmanship among the parties. It would
also likely lead to litigation over whether and when negotiations have
in fact been terminated. Such a rule would force the patentee to
consider carefully its vocabulary when discussing the potential for
further meetings or communications with the potential infringer, add-
ing a layer of formality to legal standards which already lead courts
to unduly scrutinize the patentee's choice of words for evidence of
"threats." It would also potentially negate the availability of declaratory
relief for the accused infringer, who would either be forced to wait
until the patentee terminated negotiations or assume the burden of
notifying the patentee of its intent not to participate further. In either
case, the benefit of the Act for the accused infringer would be effec-
tively lost because the patentee would presumably not declare an end
to negotiations before its infringement complaint was prepared, if not
filed. Furthermore, the accused infringer's termination of negotiations
would unambiguously signal the patentee to file suit before the ac-
cused could do so. Thus, the accused infringer would remain essen-
tially at the mercy of the patentee, who would enjoy the tactical advan-
tage of being able to choose, if not the time, then at least the forum
for litigating its dispute with the accused infringer. Yet, the opinion in
Phillips Plastics,' 88 especially when considered in combination with the
In fact, there does not even need to he an express charge of infringement in
order for a,justiciable controversy to exist.
Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
The court m Ore-Office Systems thus clearly distinguished between the legal effect of a
standard requiring an express or implied charge of infringement and one requiring a threat of
suit. Id.; see also Societe de Conditionnetnent en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938,
944 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the Constitution requires less than an actual threat of
litigation for jurisdiction under the Act, and that a charge of infringement, liberally construed,
suffices). At least one other lower court, however -, in the wake of the unexplained evolution of
the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension test, has taken the view that there is no difference,
See Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteooics Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1524,1529 n.4 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)
(noting that "[t]he Federal Circuit has only recently adopted the 'explicit threat' moniker, using
it to replace the phrase 'express charge of infringement' in the test for jurisdiction," and
concluding that both formulations express the same standard). These cases illustrate that one of
the potential deleterious effects of the change in the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional test is
confusion and potentially inconsistent decisions in the lower courts, in contravention of the
court's mission. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
The Wright court's view that "explicit threat" and 'express charge" are the same was based
on its belief that "intimidation and extrajudicial enforcement ... are necessarily present in an
express charge of infringement." 914 F, Stipp. at 1529 n.4, For the reasons discussed below in
Part V, intimidation and extrajudicial enforcement should not be considered a constitutional
requirement kw jurisdiction, and such a requirement would potentially undermine the Declara-
tory judgment Act even if every charge of infringement is treated as inherently embodying the
requisite intimidation.
188 57 F.3d at 1053-54.
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opinion in Shell Oil, 18" seems to place an unwarranted premium on the
pendency of license negotiations. The court's emphasis on the exist-
ence of license negotiations between the parties is particularly prob-
lematic in the context of determining whether an actual controversy
exists. As the court has recently acknowledged,'" the potential in-
fringer's participation in the negotiations is often principally attribut-
able to the patentee's unspoken threat of litigation.
Second, Phillips argued that, as one who may become liable for
patent infringement, it "should not be subject to manipulation by a
patentee who uses careful phrases in order to avoid explicit threats,
thus denying recourse to the courts while damages accrue."' 91 In re-
sponse, the Federal Circuit professed "(wle agree," 192 and acknow-
ledged that "the practical effect of denying access to the courts is the
concern of the Declaratory Judgment Act."'" Nonetheless, the court
held there to be no actual controversy because Phillips "was not risking
a shutdown of its business." 194 The court's rejoinder is significant be-
cause the legislative history of the Act clearly shows that resolving a
potential infringer's uncertainty regarding the accrual of damages was
the primary purpose of the Act.'" Furthermore, the court's response
to the argument that Phillips was potentially incurring liability for
damages while being refused access to the courts clearly illustrates the
difference between considering a concrete dispute over liability to be
an actual controversy, as did both the proponents of the Act' 96 and the
pre-Federal Circuit courts, 197 and refusing to find an actual controversy
in the absence of an immediate threat of litigation, which is the ap-
189 970 F.2d at 889.
EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807,811 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 789
(1997). In the court's words:
To be sure, any time parties are in negotiation over patent rights, the possihility of
a lawsuit looms in the background. No patent owner with any sense would open
negotiations by assuring his opposite party that he does not intend to enforce his
patent rights under any circumstances. The threat of enforcement—either directly
by the patentee or indirectly by a third party to whom the patentee licenses or sells
the patent—is the entire source of the patentee's bargaining power.... Thus, it is
unrealistic to suggest that some negotiating patentees intend to enforce their
patents while some do not, and that the first group is subject to declaratory
judgment jurisdiction while the second is not.
Id.
191 Phillips Plastics, 57 F.3d at 1053.
192 Id.
"I Id.
194 Id.
195 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
197 See supra Part II.
September 1997]	 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT JURISDICTION 	 935
proach taken in recent Federal Circuit decisions.'" Applying the latter
"litigation" standard, as in Phillips Plastics, the uncertainty and poten-
tial liability endured by an accused infringer is of no significance unless
and until a court can be convinced that the patentee's infringement
suit is imminent.'" This approach necessarily fosters precisely the kind
of "[g] uerilla-like" tactics the Act sought to reduce, 20" where patentees
manipulate and intimidate potential infringers. It also unfairly favors
the patentee.
In contrast, under the previous "liability" approach, an actual
controversy arises as soon as a patentee accuses another of infringe-
ment, assuming the accused infringer has a good faith basis for disput-
ing the charge. This is the proper interpretation of the Act, given its
unambiguous legislative history. 2"I Furthermore, there is no basis, even
without the weight of the intent of the Act's drafters, for holding that
a concrete dispute between a patentee and an accused infringer, as
evidenced by the patentee's public assertion of infringement and the
accused's good faith allegations of invalidity or non-infringement, is
not a legally or constitutionally sufficient controversy. 2°2 Notably, the
Federal Circuit has not attempted to articulate such a basis in its
198 See supra notes 144, 151-52 and accompanying text.
199 See 57 F.3d at 1053-54.
200
 See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 734-35 (noting that the Act was intended to provided accused
infringers relief from patentees who "brandish[] a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword" and
engage in "[g therilla-like" and "scare-the-customer-and-run tactics"),
201 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
202
 In fact, the Federal Circuit's recent emphasis on the need for a threat of suit is even more
remarkable given its unqualified assertion a few years earlier that "[i]f defendant has expressly
charged a current activity of the plaintiff as an infringement, there is clearly an actual controversy,
certainty has rendered apprehension irrelevant, and one need say no more." Arrowhead, 846 F.2d
at 736 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Federal Circuit's recent imposition of a threat of suit requirement is inexplicably
contrary to the Supreme Court's 1993 statement, in dicta, that ... a party has actually been
charged with infringement of the patent, there is, necessarily, a case or controversy adequate to
support jurisdiction of a complaint, or a counterclaim, under the Act." Cardinal Chem. Co. v,
Morton Intl, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993). The Supreme Court in Cardinal Chemical held that
the Federal Circuit need riot vacate a district court's declaratory judgment of invalidity if it affirms
the lower court's finding of non-infringement. Id. at 102-03, The Court reasoned that jurisdiction
over the declaratory judgment claim persists on appeal even where the appellate court affirms a
determination of non-infringement, as long as the district court had jurisdiction over the inde-
pendent declaratory judgment claim, Id. at 96. The Court quoted liberally from the Arrowhead
court's account of the purpose of the Declaratory judgment Act (see supra note 132 and accom-
panying text). The Court also indicated its willingness, based on that account, to find declaratory
judgment jurisdiction even absent a charge of infringement: "linIerely the desire to avoid the
threat of a 'scarecrow' patent , . , may therefore be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the
Declaratory judgment Act." Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 96 (quoting from judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943)).
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unexplained escalation of the jurisdictional threshold from "express
charge" to de jure or de facto "explicit threat."2°
The Federal Circuit's restrictive application of the Act ironically
conies as the court is enjoying accolades for its success in imparting
uniformity and stability to the field of patent law.2" Prior to the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit, patentees may justifiably have feared being
forced to defend the validity of their patents. The decisions of the
regional circuit courts of appeals on many patent law issues were
inconsistent,m and for all practical purposes, there existed no court of
last resort2"" for resolving whether patents, which have nationwide
2°3 In this regard, it is notable that as recently as 1988, the court indicated its approval of the
"liability" approach: "Nile high cost of litigation makes the bringing of a declaratory judgment
action a step not lightly undertaken, yet [the patentee's] conduct has obviously created a most
reasonable and compelled apprehension that continuing to sell its process could subject [the
accused infringer] to liability for substantial damages." Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 739 (emphasis
added).
2°1 See, e.g., HARMON, supra note 74, at ix ("[The Federal Circuit's] job was to increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law .... It would be chauvinistic in the extreme for this
author to suggest that the court has in any way failed to do that job"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1989) (asserting
that the Federal Circuit has resolved extreme differences among the regional circuit courts of
appeals, particularly with respect to issues of patent validity, including nonobviousness, double
patenting, anticipation and public use); Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit—First Ten Years
of Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON L. Rev. 499, 504 (1992) (Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, asserting that "[t]he first ten years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence has restored
efficiency and reliability to the patent law"); Jon F. Mere & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent
Litigation: 'l'he Apparent Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK Orr. Sots's.- 579, 579 (1994) (Tin the last 10 years, the
Court has made a good deal of progress towards the goal of uniformity and predictability").
205 See, e.g., Japan Gas Lighter Assoc. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Stipp. 219, 240 (D.N. 1966)
(discussing Dewey & Ahoy Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1943), and
noting that the accused infringer in Devn Almy, even if convinced that it did not infringe the
asserted patent, "hardly could have faced the accrual of potential damages with equanimity and
with confidence in the eventual outcome of a lawsuit; the history of judicial interpretation of
patent claims, after all, presents a case law developing with something less than undeviating
clarity"); Dreyfuss, supra note 204, at
2Dli See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nortoboiousness Standards: Theo-
retical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1051, 1054 n.17 (1991) (noting
that significant conflicts among the lower courts on issues of patent law resulted from the
Supreme Court's disinclination to grant certiorari in patent cases) (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-312,
at 22 (1981)). Time Supreme Court has continued its reluctance to hear patent cases throughout
most of the Federal Circuit's tenure. See David W, Whealan, Note, Atlantic Thermoplastics v.
Faytex: The. Federal Circuit Debate Over the Scope of Product -By -Process Claims, 20 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & Teen. L a[. 633, 633 n.1 (1994); see also Michael Paul Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solution
to the New Wave of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1341, 1351
(1992) ('The Federal Circuit is effectively the court of last resort for patent appeals because very
few patent cases reads the Supreme Court."). However, the Supreme Court has now considered
patent cases in both the 1995-96 and 1996-97 terms. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
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effect, would be evaluated and interpreted consistently throughout the
nation. In addition, most validity challenges were successful. 207 How-
ever, the Federal Circuit has both improved doctrinal stability and
generally revitalized the patent system by construing the law more
favorably toward patentees. 208 If anything, the Act now merits a more
liberal interpretation, given the increased confidence and certainty
patentees enjoy as a result of the court's efforts.
IV. NOTICE OF INFRINGEMENT AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
JURISDICTION
A. Notice as a Predicate for Jurisdiction
Under United States patent law, a patentee is encouraged to mark
its patented products with the corresponding patent numbers. 249 Fail-
ure to mark precludes the patentee from recovering damages for
patent infringement for infringing sales occurring prior to the time
the patentee gives notice of the infringement."'" A non-marking pat-
entee will thus typically be eager to promptly give an infringer notice,
in order to maximize the patentee's potential damage recovery. By
giving effective notice of infringement, the patentee will begin the
accrual of damages recoverable from the infringer before bringing an
infringement action.'"
Traditionally, courts have judged the legal sufficiency of commu-
nications or conduct alleged to constitute notice of infringement un-
der the patent notice and marking statute 212 without regard to whether
the acts in question would satisfy the "actual controversy" requirement
for jurisdiction under the Act.'" Similarly, courts have evaluated com-
munications or conduct asserted to give rise to an actual controversy
207 See, e.g., Karen G. Bender, et al., Patent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit: The Year 1985 in Review, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 995, 997 (1986) (regional courts
of appeal were holding only about 35% of patents valid). In contrast, the Federal Circuit has
upheld most patents. See Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Thienty
-year Patent Thrm, 22
AIPLA Q,J, 369, 419 (1994).
" See LemIcy„tupra note 207 at 421; see also Lawrence G. Kasiriner, The Revival of Confidence
in the Patent System, 731 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC' Y 5, 9-10 (1991).
209 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
210 See id.
2 " See id.
sta
215 See, e.g., Maxwell v. K Mart. Corp., 880 E Stipp. 1323, 1337-39 (D. Minn. 1995); Cecco
Mach. Mfg., Ltd. v. Intercole, Inc., 817 F, Supp. 979, 984-87 (D. Mass. 1992); In reYarn Processing
Patent Validity Litig., 602 F. Supp. 159, 169-7(1 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Lemelson v. Fisher Price Corp.,
545 F. Supp. 973, 975-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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between the alleged infringer and the patentee, thus creating jurisdic-
tion under the Act, 214
 to determine whether they evidence the "real
and immediate" conflict215
 which confers jurisdiction on the court,
without considering whether the acts relied upon would constitute
effective notice of infringement according to the legal standards estab-
lished under the patent marking and notice statute. 216 Yet, the two legal
issues (notice of infringement and declaratory judgment jurisdiction)
are factually linked because the steps a patentee takes to provide notice
of infringement are the same acts which, alone or in combination with
other acts, can precipitate the filing of a declaratory judgment action
by the accused infringer. Furthermore, the issues of notice of infringe-
ment and declaratory judgment jurisdiction should be treated as juris-
prudentially connected because of the policies each legal principle is
intended to served' and the practical realities that would-be litigants
must consider in the operation of their enterprises.
B. The Patent Marking and Notice Statute
The patent marking and notice statute is codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 287. It provides, in relevant part:
§ 287. Limitation on damages and other remedies; marking
and notice
(a) Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or sell-
ing within the United States any patented article for or under
them, or importing any patented article into the United
States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented,
either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation
"pat.", together with the number of the patent, or when, from
the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to
it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is con-
tained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure
so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in
any action for infringement, except on proof that the in-
fringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered
214 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
21N 
.5f.e Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) ("The question
in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.").
216 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
217 See infra Part V.
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only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of
an action for infringement shall constitute such notice. 218
Thus, the statute applies only to patentees who make or sell pat-
ented articles and "persons making, offering for sale, or selling . .
any patented article for or under them."2111 Such persons are author-
ized to mark the patented articles with the word "patent," or its
abbreviation, and the patent number. If the "character of the arti-
cle" precludes such marking, the statute authorizes the patentee to
mark the product's label or container instead.22" Compliance with
the marking provision permits the patentee to recover damages for
all past infringements, assuming infringement is shown and the
patent survives any challenges to its validity."' If a patentee fails to
mark its products as provided by statute, the patentee will be pre-
cluded from recovering damages for infringement which occurred
prior to the time the patentee gave notice of the infringement. 222
The notice and marking statute provides that filing an infringe-
ment action constitutes notice of infringement. 223
 The Federal Circuit,
in Amsted Industrial Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Casting Co., recently clarified
what type of conduct or communication is sufficient to satisfy the
statute. 224 In Amsted, the court strictly construed the requirement for
notice of infringement, holding that "[a]ctual notice requires the
affirmative communication of a specific charge of infringement by a
218 35 U.S.G. § 287(a).
215 Id. The "for or under" language of the statute has been interpreted to include both
express and implied licensees. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178,
185 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[i]n view of the purpose of section 287, `to encourage the patentee to give
notice to the public of the patent,' . . . there is no reason why section 287 should only apply to
express licensees and not to implied licensees") (citing American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g
Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
228 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Package or label marking has been considered an acceptable substitute
for marking the article itself when, for example, the article was too small to be marked, direct
marking would deface the article, direct marking was prohibitively expensive, or industry custom
dictated package marking. Cf. Calmar, Inc. v. Emson Research, Inc., 850 F. Stipp. 861, 868 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (holding that marking of instructional literature alone dues not satish! the statute);
Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting thin the presence of
markings other than the patent number on a patented article suggests that the patent number
could also have been marked on the article); Creative Pioneer Prod. Corp. v. K-Mart Corp., 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1848 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that marking of packages, but not
product itself when product could have been marked, did not satisfy statute). See generally
Wayne-Cossard Corp. v. Sondra, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 134{}, 1363-64 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting factors
to be considered in evaluating the permissibility of package marking).
22L See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
222 See id.
.225 Id .
224 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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specific accused product or device." 225 Some courts had previously
taken a more liberal approach to the notice requirement, holding the
view that an offer of a license under the patent, 226 or even mere
2Y.5 Id.
226  See MacPike v. American Honda Motor Co., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526,1532 (N.D. Fla.
1993) (stating that "Ialrguably, plaintiffs satisfied the legal standard of actual notice through
MacPike's testimony that he mailed a sample kit, together with a letter containing an offer to
license the patent, to the defendant," but finding the testimony in question insufficient to survive
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict).
In at least one case, the view that an offer of a license without more is sufficient for purposes
of 35 U.S.C. § 287 seemed to result from confusion between two doctrines concerning actual
notice and patent damages. See Konstant Prod. Inc. v. Frazier Indus. Co., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1223,1226-27 (N.D. III. 1992) ("an offer of a license of the patented article has been held to
constitute actual notice under Section 287."). The first principle, the subject of this article, is the
requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 287 that a patentee that fidls to mark its products with its patent
number provide notice of infringement to recover damages. The other principle is that a party
who has actual notice of a patent has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing, including, inter alio, the duty to obtain competent legal advice
before the initiation or continuation of infringing activities. See Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co,, 717 F.2d 1380,1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Failure to satisfy the duty of due
care can result in a finding that the infringement was willful, an enhanced damage award of up
to three times the actual damages and, if the case is determined to be "exceptional," an award
of die patentee's reasonable attorney fees. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285. For purposes of this article,
the fundamental difference between the two notice requirements concerns the content of the
notice. 35 U.S.C. § 287 requires that the patentee provide the alleged infringer with notice of the
infringement, i.e., that the patentee affirmatively communicate a specific charge of infringement
by identifying a specific infringing product or device. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel
Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178,186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In contrast, the potential for incurring liability
for willful infringement arises as soon as the potential infringer has notice of the patent. See
Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389-90. Such notice can arise from a patentee's offer of a license. See
Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., 772 F.2d 1570,1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The difference between notice that can give rise to liability for willful infringement and
notice that is required before non-marking patentees can become eligible for compensatory
damages is illustrated by the Federal Circuit's treatment of the facts in Amsted. The evidence
showed that the defendant, Buckeye, knew of the existence of the Amsted patent at issue at least
as early as 1976, when Buckeye procured the first of a series of written opinions concerning the
patent from its outside counsel. See Amsted, 24 F.3d at 182. Buckeye relied in part on the various
opinions to demonstrate its good faith in attempting to copy the patented invention, and to refute
Amsted's charge that Buckeye's infringement was willful. See id. at 181. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Buckeye's infringement was willful. Id. at 182-83.
The Federal Circuit further held that Amsted's customers, who purchased one element of the
patented combination from Amsted for incorporation with the rest of the invention and resale,
made and sold the patented invention "for or under" Amsted within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.
§ 287. Id. at 184-85; see also 35 U.S.C. § 287. Accordingly, the court held that Amsted had a duty
to mark its product or require its customers to mark the completed combination, which it had
not done. Amsted, 24 F.3d at 185. Having failed to mark, Amsted was relegated to eligibility for
actual damages only as of its 1989 letter in which it specifically charged Buckeye with infringe-
ment. See id. at 187. Thus, although the court held Buckeye liable for willful infringement based
in part upon its knowledge of the Amsted patent as early as 1976, Amsted's damages, which were
trebled as a result of the determination of willfulness, were calculated only from 1989. See id. at
187-88. In so holding, the Federal Circuit specifically stated, "bit is irrelevant . whether the
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notification of the existence of the patent, 227 was sufficient. The court
in Amsted held that a letter sent by the patentee to the accused in-
fringer, which merely advised the infringer of the existence of the
patent and the patentee's general intent to enforce its patent rights,
did not provide notice of infringement. The court supported this view,
in part, by noting that "Wust as such letters tend not to be threats
sufficient to justify a declaratory judgment action, they also are not
charges of infringement for 'notice' purposes. "228
Notice of infringement "must be an affirmative act on the part of
the patentee which informs the defendant of his infringement."229 The
statute requires "affirmative communication of a specific charge of
infringement by a specific accused product or device."'" The emphasis
is on the patentee providing notice of the infringement."' The accused
infringer's knowledge of the patent, or even of its own infringement,
is irrelevant for 35 U.S.C. § 287 purposes. 2 :42 The statute was designed
to encourage marking to provide notice to the public regarding the
patent status of items in commerce.'" Accordingly, failure to mark in
compliance with the statute can have severe consequences for the
patentee, who is then relegated to a damage recovery limited to in-
defendant knew of the patent. or knew of his own infringement." Id. at 187; see also Loral Fairchild
Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813, 817 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Amsted to limit
similarly the patentee's damage recovery, despite the fact that the defendants had taken licenses
under the patent, and therere clearly had notice both of the patent and its relevance to their
products).
In strictly construing the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 287, the Federal Circuit has thus
emphasized that in evaluating compliance with the statute, the court "must focus on the action
of the patentee, not the knowledge or understanding of the infringer. - Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187.
In contrast, an infringer's knowledge of the patent is enough to raise the duty of due care fin -
willful infringement purposes. See Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 482 (Fed. Cir.
1985). Giving notice of the patent to a potential infringer is merely an effective way of ensuring,
and proving, that the infringer had the requisite knowledge.
227 See Konstant Pod., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226 (stating that the notice provision of 35
U.S.C. § 287 is "liberally construed" and "is satisfied whenever the infringer is notified of the
same information which the statute requires for patent marking, which need only include the
word 'patent,* or its abbreviation, and the patent number").
228 Amsted, 24 F.3c1 at 187. The court's holding was based primarily on Dunlap v. &Wield,
where the Supreme Court held that a patentee must give notice to "particular defendants by
informing them of [the] patent and of their infringement of it." 152 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1894)
(emphasis added).
2" Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187 (citing Dunlap, 152 U.S. at 247-48, as "highly persuasive, il' not.
controlling, on the meaning of the notice requirement of section 287").
290
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id. at 185 (citing American Med. Sys., Inc., v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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fringement which occurred after it gave notice of infringement in
compliance with Amsted. 2"
Examples of communications from patentees which satisfy the
Amsted standard include:
On January 10, 1986 I wrote to you and advised of AMSTED
Industries' ownership and enforcement policy respecting the
['269 patent] . . . .
In our view [your center plate, a photocopy of which is
attached,] or the intended application thereof to a freight car
infringes the ['269 patent]. Accordingly we demand that you
immediately cease and desist from any further unauthorized
production and sales of such castings that . . . include fea-
tures covered by our patents.
We expect to . . . enforce our patent rights against your
company should the matter remain unresolved. 2"
We represent Susan M. Maxwell in her efforts to enforce
her U.S. Patent No. 4,624,060, covering a SYSTEM FOR AT-
TACHING MATED PAIRS OF SHOES TOGETHER, a copy
of which is attached.
Ms. Maxwell has previously notified you of her patent and
that shoes sold in your stores with loops attached inside
through which filaments are used to join pairs infringe her
patent. Ms. Maxwell has also offered a license to practice her
patent.
We are writing to confirm Ms. Maxwell's commitment to
enforce her patent rights. Her patent gives the exclusive right
to make, use and sell shoes joined together with her system
in the United States.
234 Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187-88 (affirming the district court's holding that Amsted had a duty
to mark, or to insist that its customers (implied licensees) mark, and thus was precluded from
recovering treble damages for the period before proper notice was given).
235 Id. at 186 (alterations in original). In contrast, the court in Amsted held that the following
letter, sent to a number of companies, including Buckeye, did not satisfy 35 U.S.G. § 287, because
it did not explicitly charge Buckeye with infringement of the specific Amsted patent in question:
This is to advise you that Amsted ... has acquired a number of properties [from
Dresser] . . . including [the '269 patent] ...
It is our understanding that Dresser Industries actively sought to enforce its patent
... and those rights have been heretofore respected in the industry. AMSTED-ASE
expects to continue to enforce those rights which it has acquired and similarly
expects our industry to respect its patents.
Accordingly, you should acquaint yourself with the ['269 patent] and refrain from
supplying or offering to supply component parts which would infringe or contribute
to the infringement of the patent q . You should not offer to supply items which arc
copies of or designed to replace our LOW PROFILE center plate.
Id. at 186 (alterations in original).
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We have already filed a patent infringement action against
J. Baker, Inc. This lawsuit, Civil Action No. 4-90-941, is now
pending in the U.S. District Court in Minnesota.
Because of our involvement in the case against J. Baker, we
do not intend to bring suit against your company in the near
future. However, we assure you that your sales of infringing
shoes remain a concern and may give rise to a legal action
after the termination of the J. Baker litigation. 2"
These examples illustrate the elements of satisfactory notice; they
(1) were communicated to a specific alleged infringer, (2) iden-
tified the specific patent alleged to be infringed, and (3) identified
the specific products alleged to be infringing. The Federal Circuit
has strictly construed the notice statute. In so doing, it has provided
a clear legal standard that will lead to greater certainty and security
in business relations and promote consistent judicial treatment. The
Federal Circuit's indication that conduct relied upon for notice of
infringement must rise to the level required to create declaratory
judgment jurisdiction"' is also laudable because it tends to "level
the playing field" for alleged infringers by diminishing the likeli-
hood that they will incur liability for damages without access to the
declaratory judgment remedy. The Amsted standard, therefore, also
decreases the potential for abusive, coercive tactics on the part of
1411 Mlucwell v. K Mail Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1338-39 (I). Minn. 1995).
In a few cases prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in Amsted, courts had recognized and
commented on the connection between notice of infringement and declaratory judgment juris-
diction. For example, in Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co., the court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to award damages for infringement occurring prior to the
patentee's filing of its infringement action, based on the trial court's finding that the failure of
the patentee to give notice to the defendant "was the result of a deliberate corporate policy on
the plaintiff's part, undertaken on advice of counsel" adopted out of concern that such notice
would "enable [the defendant] ... to obtain a decision on the issues of validity and infringement"
by filing a declaratory judgment action. 282 F.2d 653, 676 (7th Cir, 1960), The court observed
that the patentee:
determined for its own purposes to keep its patent from the scrutiny of' the courts
as long as possible. By doing so it was enabled to collect large royalties on its patent
(asserted by [the defendant] to have amounted to more than $7,000,000) which,
with the exception of the . . . claims in suit, was later held invalid by the courts.
The hardship, if such it be, placed upon Union Carbide by reason of the Master's
conclusion is the direct result of its own action, deliberately planned and carried
out for its own purpose and gain. Such being the situation, we think it cannot now
escape the consequences of its intentional refusal to give Lincoln the statutory
notice of infringement.
Id.: see also American Med. Sys. Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 794 E Supp. 1370, 1392 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (refusing to award damages before the time the patentee specifically accused the defendant
of infringement, noting that the patentee "[c] lcarly felt it advantageous to withhold making
an explicit accusation of infringement to prevent a declaratory judgment suit from being filed
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the patentee and gamesmanship on the part of the patentee's law-
yers.
The Amsted standard for notice, however, is only one half of the
equation. The exacting, precise requirement for notice established by
the Federal Circuit—a specific charge of infringement concerning a
specific accused product or device—enables the patentee to give notice
without threatening suit. In such circumstances, the accused infringer
is potentially liable for damages but may be unable to bring a declara-
tory judgment action to challenge validity and infringement. This
inequity should be corrected.
V. A RECONSIDERED APPROACH TO DETERMINING DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES
The concerns that led to the passage of the Act in 1934 are no
less real or relevant in today's business climate. Patents are valuable
because they provide potent legal ammunition. 2" However, the use of
a patent as an "economic weapon"2"—against an accused infringer
who asserts, in good faith, that the patent is either invalid or not
infringedm—is contrary to the public policy on which the patent sys-
tem is based. 24 '
A more liberal construction of the Act than that given by the
Federal Circuit in recent years is warranted by the legislative history of
by [the defendant] .... This was a calculated risk"), modified on other grounds, 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed.
Cin 1993).
238
 Upon a finding of patent infringement, a court is authorized to grant an injunction against
further infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994). In addition, a patentee who prevails on a claim
of patent infringement is entitled to an award of compensatory damages in no event less than
a reasonable royalty," as well as attorneys fees and costs in "exceptional cases.' See id. §§ 284, 285
(1994); see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Pre- and post-judgment interest
on damages, fees and costs is also available. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994); General Motors Corp.
v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983). Finally, the patent statute authorizes a court to "increase
the damages tip to three tunes the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. Increased damage
awards are typically based on a determination that the infringement was willful. See HARMON,
supra note 74, § 14.1; see also supra note 226.
2" See Dewey & Aliny Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1943)
(observing that such use forces the accused infringer to either (1) abandon its activities, (2) take
a license on unfavorable terms, or (3) "persist in piling up potential damages against the day
when it inay lit [the patentee's] purposes to bring an infringement suit against it").
240 See Treemund Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 705 (3d Cir. 1941) ("Manifestly, the
threat is as unjust if the plaintiff is not infringing a valid patent as it is if he is infringing an invalid
one.").
241 See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971)
(stating that "[t] he holder of a patent should not be insulated from the assertion of defenses and
thus allowed to exact royalties for the use of an idea that is not in fact patentable or that is beyond
the scope of the patent monopoly granted"). See generally Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
September 1997]	 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT JURISDICUON 	 945
the Act,242 the pre-Federal Circuit judicial interpretation of the Act, 241
the business realities faced by patentees and potential infringers ,244 and
the impact of the Federal Circuit on doctrinal stability and patent
vitality. 245 Specifically, the courts, including the Federal Circuit, should
guard against placing significant weight on the existence of pending
license negotiations. To do otherwise is to unduly emphasize the par-
ticular language employed by the parties and to unfairly handicap the
accused infringer, in contravention of the policies underlying the Act.
More importantly, the courts should return to the view that a reason-
able apprehension of liability on the part of the accused infringer is
sufficient to satisfy the Act's requirement for an actual controversy—
without regard to the imminence of the patentee instituting patent
infringement litigation. For the reasons discussed above, the liability
standard better reflects the legislative intent and the business realities.
It is also consistent with the law of marking and notice.
For example, to the extent that the courts regard actions on the
part of a patentee as effective notice of infringement, but not sufficient
to create the objectively reasonable apprehension of suit now required
for declaratory judgment jurisdiction , 246 the patentee enjoys an unfair
advantage. Liability for damages begins to accrue against the accused
infringer as of the date notice of infringement is given, 247 while the
patentee retains complete control over when, and sometimes more
significantly, where to subject its patent to judicial scrutiny. The un-
availability of declaratory judgment relief in such circumstances can
therefore impose significant hardship on the accused infringet;24R who
is left at the mercy of the patentee. 249
670-71 (1969) (repudiating the doctrine of licensee estoppel, recognizing that "Pit [licensees]
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-he monopolists
without need or justification . [T]he technical requirements of contract doctrine must give
way before the demands of the public interest").
242 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
245 See supra Part I
244 See supra notes 113, 133 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 204, 208 and accompanying text.
246 see, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 789 (1997) (reciting requirement that "the patentee's conduct must have created an
objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of the [declaratory judgment] plaintiff that the
patentee will initiate suit if the [allegedly infringing] activity ... continues").
247 See 35 U.S.C. itj 287(a) (1994).
24" See the LensCorp/CheinCo hypothetical discussed above.
24" See Edward W. Remus & Thomas A. Fairhall, Prerequisites to Recovery of Damages: lmbor-
lance of Marking and Notice of Infringement, A,L.I,-A.B.A. CouRsE OF STUDY, (Nov. 9, 1995),
available in WESTLAW at CA15 ALI-ABA 413, 441-42 (asserting that the legal standards govern-
ing notice of infringement and declaratory judgment jurisdiction are different and arguing that
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Any inconsistency between the standards for notice of infringe-
ment and declaratory judgment jurisdiction is also contrary to the
policies underlying the patents clause of the Constitution 25° and the
patent statute,251
 in that a potentially invalid patent252 may be used to
deter the accused infringer from pursuing activities that are potentially
beneficial to society. At the same time, the accused infringer is power-
less to litigate and resolve the merits of the patent. A perceived "gap"
between what is required for notice and what is sufficient for declara-
tory judgment jurisdiction also disproportionately emphasizes the sig-
nificance of particular language in written and oral notice communi-
no communication of a patentee should be considered to constitute notice of infringement in
compliance with the patent notice and marking statute if it would not have met the requirements
for declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). As the Supreme Court has observed on
several occasions, the constitutionally enshrined policy in favor of promoting the progress of
useful arts must be tempered with regard for the public interest:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.... [It] is an exception
to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open
market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore,
give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from
backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monop-
olies are kept within their legitimate scope.
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
For this reason, "the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed." Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964).
251 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1994).
252 All issued United States patent is presumed valid. See id. § 282. Nevertheless, a patent may
be declared invalid for failure to comply with any of the statutory requirements of patentability,
whether or not such issues were considered by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office prior to
issuance of the patent. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("All evidence bearing on the validity issue, whether considered by the PTO
or not, is to be taken into account by the tribunal in which validity is attacked."). The statutory
requirements include requirements that the invention claimed in the patent fall within the
categories Congress considers appropriate for patent protection, and be useful, novel, and
nonobvious. See 35 U.S.C. ,§§ 101-103. In addition, the patent specification must provide a written
description of the invention, which would both enable a person skilled in the art to which the
invention pertains to make and use the invention and set forth the "best mode" perceived by the
inventor for carrying out the invention. See id. § 112. The claim language used to define the
invention must also be definite. See id.; PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3(1 1558,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that "paragraph two of section 112 is essentially a requirement for
precision and definiteness of claim language'") (quoting In re Borowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909
(C.C.P.A. 1970)).
In addition to these statutory patentability issues, a patent may be declared unenforceable
on the basis of a variety ()I' non-statutory defenses to a charge of patent infringement, including
inequitable conduct in the procurement of the patent from the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
patent misuse, laches, and equitable estoppel. See generally ABB Robotics v. GMFanue Robotics
Corp„ 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (equitable estoppel); Advanced Cardiovascular
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cations. The disproportionate emphasis occurs as patentees and their
counsel carefully attempt to satisfy the notice statute without triggering
the declaratory judgment statute,2" promoting inefficiency in the use
of legal and business resources.
The factual circumstances that bring a patentee and a potential
infringer before a judge on opposite sides of a motion to dismiss a
declaratory judgment claim are varied. Moreover, as the Federal Cir-
cuit has recently admonished, "[t]he relationships are rarely as simple
as they appear in judicial opinions." 2 " However, many cases that raise
the issue of a potential infringer's access to declaratory relief share a
common factual predicate: the patentee has asserted that a present
activity of the potential infringer invades the patentee's statutory right
to exclude. 255 Such an assertion evidences the existence of a constitu-
tionally sufficient actual controversy, when met in the accused in-
fringer's declaratory judgment complaint by the accused's good faith
allegations256 that the patent asserted by the patentee is invalid, unen-
forceable,257 and/or not infringed. The focus is not on the particular
language chosen by the patentee, but rather rests on the substance of
Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., 988 F.2d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (ladies); Gardco mug., Inc. v. Herst
Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (inequitable conduct, patent misuse).
255 In the author's experience, prior to the Amsted decision, many practitioners held the view
that notice of infringement sufficient to trigger the accrual of damages could he given without
creating an actual controversy with the accused infringer. See Ronald B. Coolley, Notifications of
Infringement and Their Consequences, 771 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 246, 252 (1995). The
patentee's goal was to hold the patent over the head of the accused while dangling it just out of
the accused's reach.
The patentee has great incentive to avoid, if possible, actually bringing an infringement
action. Aside from the expense and delay of litigation, the patentee seeks to avoid judicial scrutiny
of the patent's validity or a potentially unfavorable construction of the patent's coverage or scope.
Once these issues have been litigated and decided in a manner unfavorable to the patentee, the
patentee is precluded from re-litigating them in cases involving other defendants and allegedly
infringing products. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
349-50 (1971). Thus, the patentee generally prefers an agreement on the part of the accused
infringer to pay royalties for its use of the patented invention over judicial resolution of its claim.
254 13P Clients. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
255 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
256 Good faith allegations are those which would satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, which provides its own measure of protection for the patentee against the
assertion of baseless, unsupportable defenses to patent infringement. FED. R. CP/. P. 11.
257 The patent statute distinguishes between the affirmative defenses of invalidity and mien-
ferceability. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. According to the statute, invalidity results from the failure of the
patent or any claim in suit to comply with the statutory requirements of patentability, including
the requirements concerning the sufficiency of the patent specification, specificity of the claims,
and conditions for reissue. See id. One or more claims of a patent can be held invalid without
invalidation of the entire patent. See IP. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561-62
(Fed. Cir. 1984). On the other hand, a patentee's inequitable conduct, for example, in the
procurement of the patent, renders the entire patent unenforceable. See id. at 1560-61.
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the charge: has the patentee asserted that the conduct of the accused
infringer renders it liable for infringemen 0258
This test should facilitate judicial decision-making and promote
consistency in the process. An inquiry into whether the patentee has
made a charge of infringement or not is substantially easier for a court
to make than a searching and subjective analysis of whether the pat-
entee is ready to commence an infringement suit. 259
Of course, a grant of jurisdiction merely provides a forum to
litigate the issues of validity and infringement. Litigation is undoubt-
edly expensive and time-consuming. Nevertheless, the parties involved
in a declaratory judgment proceeding will each have the opportunity
to advance or defend their positions. Presumably, a court will reach
the right result on disputed issues of validity and/or infringement. It
is worth noting, however, that even where one or more of the parties
is not satisfied with the correctness of the result, the parties will at least
have the certainty which was the promise of the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has clearly and consistently resolved many
of the issues confronted by parties engaged in disputes involving pat-
ents. The Federal Circuit's imposition of a rigorous requirement that
a threat of suit exist before a declaratory judgment action may be
brought, however, encourages patentees to engage in the "guerrilla-
like" conduct criticized in the Arrowhead decision, leaving potential
infringers at a distinct disadvantage.
The time has come for the Federal Circuit to apply a standard for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction that recognizes business realities and
can be fairly and consistently applied. A standard that recognizes
jurisdiction when the patentee asserts a charge of infringement is
consistent with the policy and purpose of the Act and properly places
patentees and alleged infringers on equal footing.
'58 A court applying this test to the LensCorp/ChemCo hypothetical discussed above would
properly accept jurisdiction of LenCorp's declaratory judgment action.
259
 As discussed supra in Part III.B, the Federal Circuit has improperly focused in recent
decisions on whether the patentee intends to imminently file suit.
